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TRESPASSORY ART
Randall Bezanson*
Andrew Finkelman**
The history of art is replete with examples of artists who have broken from existing
conventions and genres, redefining the meaning of art and its function in society.
Our interest is in emerging forms of art that trespass-occupy space, place, and
time as part of their aesthetic identity. These new forms of art, which we call tres-
passory art, are creatures of a movement that seeks to appropriate cultural norms
and cultural signals, reinterpreting them to create new meaning. Marcel
DuChamp produced such a result when, in the early twentieth century, he took a
urinal, signed it, titled it Fountain, and called it art.
Whether they employ twenty-first-century technologies, such as lasers, or painting,
sculpture and mosaic, music, theatre, or merely the human body, these new artists
share one thing in common. Integral to their art is the physical invasion of space,
the trespass, often challenging our conventional ideas of location, time, ownership,
and artistic expression. Their art requires not only borrowing the intellectual assets
of others, but their physical assets. This is trespassory art-art that redefines and
reinterprets space-art that gives new meaning to a park bench, to a billboard, to
a wall, to space itself
Our purpose is to propose a modified regime in the law of trespass to make room
for the many new forms of art with which we are concerned-art that is location-
ally dependent or site specific. We begin by briefly describing and characterizing
these often-new artistic forms. This provides a jumping off point for addressing the
basic question this Article seeks to address-should the law accommodate these
new types of art, and if so, to what degree? We first turn to the law of trespass,
with particular focus on real property, both public and private, but also with an
eye to personal and intellectual property. We conclude that adjusting trespass
remedies for artistic trespass through a set of common law privileges would better
balance the competing interests of owners and artists than do current trespass
rules. We then turn to a set of constitutional issues and conclude that our com-
mon law proposal is consistent with, and in some ways perhaps required by, the
First Amendment. Finally, we summarize our proposal and then revisit the value
of trespassory art as art in our creative culture.
* David H. Vernon Professor of Law, University of Iowa.
** Assistant U.S. Attorney, United States Attorney's Office for the District of Colum-
bia. The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the authors and do not represent the
views of the United States Attorney's Office, the Department of Justice or of the United
States.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Art is being transformed. Artists are pushing their discipline in
innovative and unexplored directions. This is nothing new. The
history of art is replete with examples of artists who have broken
from existing conventions and genres, redefining the meaning of
art and its function in society. Seminal artists such as Pablo Picasso
helped to break art free from its moorings in literal representation
and query the meaning of representation itself. Eduard Manet,
with paintings such as Olympia, challenged social mores and the
meaning of beauty in nineteenth-century French society.
The new art is not so much a creature of one artist, but rather a
movement that seeks to appropriate cultural norms and cultural
signals, reinterpreting them to create new meaning. Marcel
DuChamp produced such a result when, in the early twentieth cen-
tury, he took a urinal, signed it "R. Mutt," the name of the largest
urinal manufacturer in France, titled it Fountain, and called it art.
Ren6 Magritte similarly challenged his audience when he attached
the label "ceci n'est pas une pipd' ("this is not a pipe") to a massive
painting of a pipe. Other artists, such as Thomas Nast, have oper-
ated on the overtly political level, using a chosen art form (in
Nast's case, the cartoon) to shatter the political order.'
Whether they employ twenty-first-century technologies such as
lasers, or the more familiar mediums of painting, sculpture and
mosaic, music, or theatre, or merely the human body, the new art-
ists we focus on share one thing in common. Integral to their art is
the physical invasion of space, the trespass, often challenging our
conventional ideas of location, time, ownership, and artistic ex-
pression. Their art requires not only borrowing the intellectual
assets of others, but their physical assets. In a way, these artists re-
semble Andy Warhol and Jeff Koons. Warhol's art borrowed and
reinterpreted the popular symbols of his era and before, giving
them new meaning as pop icons. Think of a Campbell's soup can.
Koons, the controversial artist (and the subject of myriad court opi-
nions), has controversially appropriated pop culture images,
running afoul of the copyright laws in the process. Other artists
and groups have attempted to jam the signals and lines of trans-
1. Thomas Nast's political cartoons helped bring about the demise of William "Boss"
Tweed and his corrupt rule over New York politics in the 1870s. See generally KENNETH Ac-
KERMAN, Boss TWEED: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CORRUPT POL WHO CONCEIVED THE SOUL
OF MODERN NEW YORK (2005) (describing the Tweed ring and the prominent role Nast
played in exposing and ending it).
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mission of mass media and pop culture and to reframe intellectual
property. Their efforts are ably addressed elsewhere
Artists have increasingly used art not merely as a means to in-
vade incorporeal property rights, but also tangible or real property
rights. It is art without borders or boundaries. This is trespassory
art-art that redefines and reinterprets space, art that gives new
meaning to a park bench, to a billboard, to a wall, to space itself.
3
Our purpose in this Article is to propose a modified regime in
the law of trespass to make room for the many new forms of art
with which we are concerned-art that is locationally dependent or
site specific. In Part II, we begin by briefly describing and charac-
terizing these often-new artistic forms. This will provide a jumping-
off point for addressing the basic question this Article seeks to
address-should the law accommodate these new types of art, and
if so, to what degree? In Part III, we examine the law of trespass,
with particular focus on real property, both public and private, but
also with an eye to personal and intellectual property. We conclude
that adjusting trespass remedies for artistic trespass through a set
of common law privileges would better balance the competing in-
terests of owners and artists than do current trespass rules. In Part
IV, we turn to a set of constitutional issues and conclude that our
common law proposal is consistent with, and in some ways perhaps
required by, the First Amendment. Finally, in Part V, we summarize
our proposal and then revisit the value of trespassory art as art in
our creative culture.
II. FIVE EXAMPLES OF TREsPASsoRY ART
A. Spencer Tunick
Spencer Tunick has achieved considerable acclaim for what he
calls "temporary site-specific installations of nude people forming
abstract shapes."4 In plain terms, Tunick assembles hundreds or
thousands of naked people to pose in urban and rural settings
around the globe. He has earned considerable acclaim and notori-
ety for his work.5 It is not difficult to understand why. In May 2007,
2. See Sonia Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 489 (2006).
3. Christian Hundertmark notes that "part of the creativity of [rebellious art in the
urban environment] is how it integrates within the environment, the chosen spot which
gives it the finishing touch." CHRISTIAN HUNDERTMARK, THE ART OF REBELLION: WORLD OF
STREETART 6 (Gingko Press Inc. 2003).
4. Kathryn Rosenfield, Taking it to the Streets, New ART EXAM'R, Oct. 1999, at 68.
5. See Alison Green, Spencer Tunick, ART MONTHLY, Nov. 2001, at 26 (describing Tu-
nick as "fairly notorious for the photo shoots he organises where hundreds of people take
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he brought together 18,000 people in Mexico City's main square,
the Zocalo, for nude group art. He has executed similar projects in
places like Buffalo, New York (1,800 nudes), Cleveland, Ohio
(2,754 nudes), New Castle upon Tyne (1,700 nudes),6 Barcelona,
Australia, and the list goes on. Recently, he collaborated with
Greenpeace to create what he called a "living sculpture" on the
Aletsch Glacier in Switzerland. They aimed to draw attention to the
problem of global warming and the prospect of the disappearance
of the Swiss glaciers by the end of the century by creating a "sym-
bolic relationship" between the vulnerable glaciers and the human
body.'
SWITZERLAND, ALETSCH GLACIER 1 (GREENPEACE) 2007,
COURTESY OF SPENCER TUNICK
off their clothes and lie down in the middle of a street or park or field."); Dany Louise,
Spencer Tunick, ART MONTHLY, Mar. 2006, at 22.
6. See Hundreds of Nudes Cross the Tyne, BBC NEWS, July 17, 2005, http://
news.bbc.couk 1/hi/entertainment/ arts/4689421.stm (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
7. See Volunteers Strip off to Fight Climate Change, SWISSINFO.CH, Aug. 18, 2007,
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/front/detail/Volunteers-stip down-to fight-climate-chang
e.html?siteSect=105&sid=8116840 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
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On location, Tunick acts as would a director on a film set, direct-
ing the placement of each naked person to form a tapestry of
human forms. The images are striking. They plunge the viewer
into what one critic describes as "a nihilistic world" that blurs the
"boundaries between the safe and familiar, and the horrors we
know about but can't face."8 What is truly exceptional about
Tunick's work is not the nudity per se. Tunick characterizes the col-
lection of naked bodies sprawled across the urban landscape as a
non-sexual, sensual spectacle.9 But even so, throngs of nude people
in places like New York or Cleveland is not something one is accus-
tomed to seeing.
Although American law tends to distinguish between sensual
nudity in the service of art and overtly sexual nudity that qualifies
as obscene, Tunick has had his run-ins with the law. For example, a
New York criminal statute on "exposure" prohibits nudity in public,
but makes exception for the "breastfeeding of infants or to any
person entertaining or performing in a play, exhibition, show or
entertainment."' Tunick's work does not easily fit any of these
categories. New York City authorities have tended to agree. Not
surprisingly, Tunick and his nude subjects have been arrested sev-
eral times.1"
On April 25, 1999, Tunick attempted a nude photo shoot at West
Forty-Seventh Street and Seventh Avenue in New York City. Police
arrested Tunick and several of his models before he was able to
proceed with his work. On June 6, 1999, Tunick applied for a per-
mit for his group art from the Mayor's Office of Film, Theater, and
Broadcasting ("MOIFTB") to photograph persons on the sidewalk
of Sixth Avenue between Fortieth and Forty-First Streets in the
early morning hours. When the office refused to issue a permit,
Tunick proceeded anyway. He was met by the police, who threat-
ened to arrest him if anyone disrobed. 2 Tunick took his case to
court, seeking permission to proceed with his art. The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York en-
joined the City from interfering with Tunick's group art on the
grounds that, as applied to Tunick, the statute impermissibly inter-
fered with his First Amendment rights, as nude photography
qualified as "protected expression." The city argued that privacy
8. Louise, supra note 5, at 23.
9. See Green, supra note 5, at 27; Spencer Tunick, http://www.spencertunick.com/
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
10. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.01 (2008).
11. SeeTunick v. Safir, No. 99 Cir. 5053,1999 WL 511852, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.July 19,1999).
12. Id.
13. Id. at *4.
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interests of the residents of the neighborhood where Tunick in-
tended to stage his installation, and the fact that they might object
to seeing between seventy-five and one hundred naked persons
outside their windows, overrode Tunick's freedom of expression.
4
The District Court disagreed, stating that "the Constitution does
not permit government to decide which types of otherwise pro-
tected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for
the unwilling listener or viewer. Rather . .. the burden normally
falls upon the viewer to avoid further bombardment of his sensi-
bilities simply by averting his eyes."'* The Second Circuit ultimately
agreed, and Tunick was allowed to proceed with his work.16
Tunick's works, and the judicial opinions attempting to deal with
them, illustrate the challenge the artist poses to the law. It was only
through case-by-case litigation under the First Amendment that he
was allowed to proceed.17 Yet the Supreme Court has struggled with
art in its constitutional jurisprudence, unsure whether to treat it as
speech, conduct, or neither. Tunick's work challenges a key ele-
ment of traditional First Amendment analysis. When weighing the
constitutionality of state action that threatens to suppress constitu-
tionally protected speech, the court asks whether alternative
avenues for the communication exist. The site specificity of Tu-
nick's work complicates this inquiry.
The interaction of the nude forms and their surroundings is
critical to Tunick's work. Each location provides new meaning.1 8 In
this sense, Tunick's work carries on in the tradition of land artists,
for whom the site is an indispensable part of the art.'9 Tunick's
Switzerland installation, and the interaction between the human
form and the glacier, created different symbiotical meaning than
the Manhattan group art produces, where human figures meet
pavement. But Tunick could not capture his artistic message without
access to the site that makes the message. He could not achieve his
purposes were he consistently confined indoors. Filling the seats at
Avery Fisher Hall at Lincoln Center would capture meanings, but
14. Id. at *5.
15. Id. at *6 (quoting Erznoznik v.Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975)).
16. Tunick v. Safir, 228 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2000).
17. Id. at 136 (describing Tunick's challenge to New York law that would allow him to
proceed with the shoot).
18. Tunick, supra note 9.
19. See Nellie Viner, The New Jurisprudential Frontier: Art and the Changing Land-
scape of the First Amendment 46 (Dec. 6, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) ("For Spencer Tunick and his land artist
ancestors, their work is embedded in the environment and landscape. For artists who gain
inspiration and base their resulting work firmly in the soil or concrete of a specific location,
it is impossible to transport their pieces to a different place.").
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ones that are necessarily different from an outdoor location. The
site specificity of his work brushes up against the boundaries of
free speech and against the limits states and cities have imposed on
public nudity and public assembly. Tunick's art demonstrates the
critical importance of site and environment in these new forms of
art.
B. Billboard Liberation, Shopdropping, and the
Non-Propositional Urban Trespassory Art
The next two examples involve art forms that feature similar ar-
tistic elements and pose comparable legal dilemmas. Billboard
alteration (or "liberation") and shopdropping represent two ex-
amples of a broad range of overfly trespassory art. They are
illustrative of art that might at once be described as a type of
groundbreaking social commentary, or rather, as mere vandalism.
We turn first to billboard alteration, as practiced by the "Billboard
Liberation Front."
Billboard alteration is one genre of the art with trespass at its
core. The art form uses trespass as a vehicle to achieve the appro-
priation and reformulation of symbols. The Billboard Liberation
Front is one of the most prominent of these groups. Others have
also attempted to counteract objectionable mass-media messages
through billboard or sign alteration. For example, the group Art
Fux replaced a McDonald's billboard with the message
"McDonalds-Better Living Through Chemistry. 2 ' A successor
group, the Cicada Group, placed vinyl stencils of the word "hate"
on STOP signs,21 and another group, the Art Fux group, altered a
Coca-Cola billboard to display the following message: "Drink Coca-
Cola-It Makes You Fart.
2 2
The Billboard Liberation Front ("BLF") has existed since 1977,
and in that time has developed a methodical approach to its art.
23
Terming their objects "clients," the BLF provides pro bono
20. CITIZEN ART, CULTUREJAMMING (National Film Network 1996).
21. Id. Thus, the message "STOP HATE."
22. MARK DERY, CULTURE JAMMING: HACKING, SLASHING AND SNIPING IN THE
EMPIRE OF SIGNS (Open Magazine Pamphlet Series, 1993) (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.markdery.com/archives/
books/culture.jamming/#000005%23more.
23. Billboard Liberation Front, History and Timeline, http://www.
billboardliberation.com/history.html (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law
Reform).
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billboard alteration services.24 Consider one example of its work. In
the wake of the Exxon Valdez disaster, the BLF altered a billboard
that read "Hits Happen-New X-100" to read "Shit Happens-New
Exxon."25 More recently, the group pilloried one telecommunica-
tions giant for its collaboration with the government. After the BLF
was finished with it, one AT&T billboard read "AT&T Works in
More Places, Like NSA Headquarters." 26 The BLF argues (tongue-
in-cheek, no doubt) that their billboard alteration is actually bill-
board "improvement," which is not illegal but "invoicable. '2 7 By
that they mean that they bill their corporate "clients" for their
work. The art of the BLF is not vandalism in its true sense-the
group makes the point that they don't damage the billboard itself.
The law currently takes no account of such distinctions, and makes
the BLF potentially liable for trespass and vandalism. But theirs is a
particular type of art-speech that interferes with one particular
message, substituting another. Another practitioner of billboard
alteration describes the goals of the art: to "throw a well aimed
spanner into the media's gears, bring the image factory to a shud-
dering halt. We work to unmask the real corporate activity behind
the glamorous image, and to assault the billboard itself, to question
its given function.,
28
Although their methods differ from those of the BLF, "shop-
dropping" and "droplifting" are related phenomena. Like the BLF,
shopdroppers and droplifters jam and reformulate cultural signals
and messages. They are reverse shoplifters. Instead of removing an
object from a store, they add to the store's shelves. Shopdroppers
have made grocery stores their main target. They physically alter
canned goods and similar merchandise. Shopdroppers leave the
bar codes and certain basic descriptions on the product, but alter
everything else. In this manner, a customer can take the altered
can of peas home. But instead of seeing the "Green Giant" or the
label "Goya Beans," the customer leaves the store with something
24. BILLBOARD LIBERATION FRONT, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF BILLBOARD IMPROVE-
MENT 17 (2008), http://www.billboardliberation.com/ArtAndScience-BLEpdf (on file with
the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
25. DERY, supra note 22.
26. A picture of the billboard is visible on BLF's website. The billboard formerly read
"AT&T Works in More Places, Like CHILONDOSCOW." Press Release, Billboard Liberation
Front (Feb. 27, 2008), http://www.billboardliberation.com/HQ.html (on file with the Uni-
versity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
27. Jack Napier, Questions for Redressing the Imposition on Public Space, http://
www.billboardliberation.com/response.html (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform).
28. Billboard Subversion Guide, Smashing the Image Factory: A Complete Manual of
Billboard Subversion & Destruction, http://www.urban75.com/Action/factory.html (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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different altogether. Preprinted labels featuring landscape scenes
or abstract designs replace the normal commercial message. The
new labels are true works of art. Shopdroppers have done for
canned goods what the Billboard Liberation Front and others have
done for the street sign.
Ryan Watkins-Hughes, a practitioner of shopdropping, describes
what it is all about:
SHOPDROPPING strives to take back a share of the visual
space we encounter on a daily basis. Similar to the way street
art stakes a claim to public space for self expression ... shop-
dropping ... subverts commercial space for artistic use in an
attempt to disrupt the mundane commercial process with a
purely artistic moment. The vibrant individuality of each im-
age is a stark contrast to the repetitive, functional, package
design that is replaced. Shopdropping gives voice to the per-
vasive disillusionment from our increasingly commercial
society. A voice that is, paradoxically, made possible only by
commercial technological advancements.
29
Droplifters also surreptitiously add merchandise to stores. They
primarily target the large record store. Disseminating droplifting
instructions over the web, droplifters encourage citizens to burn
alternative music (which they make available on their website)
onto a CD, print out a CD label, and then infiltrate a large music
store and slip the CD into record store bins. ° What do droplifters
aim to achieve? The choice of the large record store-usually one
of the global chains such as Virgin or Tower-is not inadvertent.
Droplifters add their own music to the ranks of artists sponsored by
media conglomerates. Those corporations often own the rights to
reproduce media and enforce their copyright restrictions ruth-
lessly. Because these companies have begun to sue or seek criminal
prosecution of persons responsible for online music sharing sys-
tems (like Napster), droplifting music represents a new way to
evade the music giants.
[The medium] calls into question the sorry state of the Music
Industry Conglomerates, who determine the kinds of sound art
that can be created by threatening legal actions and outdated
29. Ryan Watkins-Hughes, http://ww.shopdropping.net (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
30. Droplift Guide, http://vw.droplift.org/guide.html (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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interpretations of law the only effect of which is to stifle free
expression and criticism in mass media forms.
*.. [Droplifting questions the] distribution of a limited selec-
tion of cultural material by dominant corporate music retail
giants... [which] stifle [s] new voices, especially dissenting or
31
critical ones.
As culture jamming devices, shopdropping and droplifting fol-
low in the tradition of groups such as the Barbie Liberation
Organization ("BLO"). That group achieved notoriety during the
1980s when it switched the computer chips in Barbie and G.I. Joe
dolls. Following the BLO prank, children opened male G.I. Joe
dolls and heard them exclaim presumably-feminine thoughts such
as "let's plan our dream wedding" and vice-versa. 2 These groups
switch, obstruct, and reformulate messages that our media culture
disseminates to the masses. They practice the art of the detourne-
ment, as developed by the avant-garde artist group the Situationists,
which was "committed to detouring the pre-existing political and
commercial rhetorics in an effort to subvert and reclaim them.
3
Billboard "liberation" and shopdroppers are the best examples
among this group of "culture jamming" trespassory artists. De-
scribed by one author as a movement aimed against the
"advertising-saturated, corporate-ruled consumer culture," culture
jamming takes a number of forms, most of which are designed to
twist and reformulate the pro-consumption corporate-based mes-
sages with which individuals are regularly bombarded. 4 Culture
jammers like the BLF engage in so-called liberation art, freeing
individuals to reject consumerism and forge their own reality
rather than to accept it in sound bytes from the media. Jammers
provide a sort of "emancipator knowledge" by identifying and dis-
torting "hidden sources of oppression in individual lives and
31. Id.
32. lan Urbina, Anarchists in the Aisles? Stores Provide a Stage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2007,
at Al; see also Sniggle.net, Barbie Liberation, http://sniggle.net/barbie.php (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). The BLO reprogrammed Barbie to say such
things as "Vengeance is mine!"
33. Christine Harold, Pranking Retoric: "Culture Jamming" as Media Activitism, 21 CRITI-
CAL STUD. MEDIA COMM. 189, 192 (2004).
34. Jennifer A. Sandlin, Popular Culture, Culture Resistance, and Anticonsumption Activism:
An Exploration of Culture Jamming As Critical Adult Education, NEw DIRECTIONS FOR ADULT &
CONTINUING EDUC., Fall 2007, at 73.
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distortion of social relations among people."3 They seek to "incite
authenticity.
3 6
Their technique-the reorientation and reinterpretation of vis-
ual symbols-is particularly effective because of the increasing
centrality of visual culture in everyday life.37 One commentator has
described these efforts as "semiotic Robin Hoodism."38 Another
culture jammer articulates his vision of trespassory art in the cause
of cultural liberation as the "symbolic obliteration of a one-way in-
formation pipeline that only transmits, never receives. It is an act
of sympathetic magic performed in the name of all who are
obliged to peer at the world through peepholes owned by multina-
tional conglomerates for whom the profit margin is the bottom
line."3 9
Of course, those billboard liberation artists represent merely
one species in the genus of urban, trespassory artists. Other groups
employ similar techniques-alteration of billboards or other public
structures-to achieve different, or at least, more abstract ends.
Consider the group Urban Blooz. An art project that started in
2003, predominantly in Europe, Urban Blooz reclaims commercial
advertising space on billboards.40 The message it recodes, however,
is decidedly ambiguous and abstract. Rather than twisting a corpo-
rate message in favor of a punchy countercultural slogan, it
attempts to recreate the view a bystander would have had the bill-
board never existed. For example, in lieu of a billboard for the
French hamburger chain Quick (France's indigenous version of
McDonald's) that stands in front of a one-hundred year old oak
tree along a suburban road in southeastern France, Urban Blooz
attempted to eliminate the billboard altogether. This was accom-
plished by pasting over the billboard a photograph of the portion
of the tree that the billboard actually covers. Is the stunt a frontal
assault on commercialism as a whole, a micro-abnegation of com-
mercial culture, a message of disapproval of the particular
corporate message that is wiped out? Or is it the mere expression
of an aesthetic preference?
35. David Darts, Visual Culture Jam: Art, Pedagogy, and Creative Resistance, 4 STUDIES ART
EDUC. 313, 316 (2004).
36. Sandlin, supra note 34, at 79.
37. Darts, supra note 35, at 315.
38. Id. at 321 (citing NAOMI KLEIN, No LoGo. TAKING AIM AT TIE BRAND BULLIES 280
(2000)).
39. DERY, supra note 22.
40. For additional background on Urban Blooz, see Urban Blooz, http://
urbanblooz.org/ (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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URBAN BLOOZ PROJECT 2003, COURTESY OF BRICE DELARUE
When the BLF obliterates an advertisement in favor of a
counter-corporate slogan, the message is susceptible to only one
meaning. BLF supplies that meaning. The work of Urban Blooz is
by contrast non-propositional. The reworked billboard is purely
creative insofar as it invites (but does not force) the viewer to as-
cribe meaning to it.
The work of the BLF and other billboard-alteration groups dif-
fers from the droplifters. The former alters whereas the latter
generally only add. From a legal perspective, however, they both
engage in trespass. Although record and grocery stores commonly
open themselves to the general public, they decidedly do not wel-
come interference with their product line. In addition to the
trespass to the store owner's real property, altering canned goods
likely constitutes trespass to chattels, which creates liability for the
wrongful interference with the personal property of another.4 1
Shopdropping also invites regulatory sanction. By obscuring all but
the barcode on a can of peaches or garbanzo beans, shopdroppers
eliminate other information that state and federal agencies may or
may not mandate that companies provide, such as health warnings,
identification of the origin of the food, etc.4 2 Finally, like the BLO,
shopdroppers potentially run the risk of liability in connection
41. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 14 (5th ed. 1984).
42. See Urbina, supra note 32.
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with the unapproved alteration of manufacturers copyright and
trademark rights in their products.
Not surprisingly, the BLF and the shopdroppers/droplifters em-
phasize a common goal--don't get caught.
C. Graffiti and Laser Graffiti
Laser graffiti is a new phenomenon, but it is a new form of an
ancient art with a deep (and controversial) history. From the caves
in Lascaux, France to Roman ruins in Ephesus, Pompeii and else-
where, to the Great Buddha of Bamiyan, humanity has
continuously sought to express itself through markings and in-
scriptions on natural and man-made features. In the United States,
graffiti became particularly prominent in the 1970s and 1980s
when hip-hop and rap music, and the proliferation of gangs in
American cities, caused storefronts, subway cars, and alleys to suf-
fer a scourge of spray-can graffiti. Graffiti can be art. It can also be
a form of "tagging," a marker denoting territorial control or iden-
tity.43 Although graffiti still plagues certain urban areas, the art has
been mainstreamed to a large degree. Graffiti artists congregate in
specially designated outdoor areas and now display their work in
art galleries.4
43. See The Words: A Graffiti Glossary, http://www.graffiti.org/faq/
graffiti.glossary.html (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
44. See Suzanne Daley, Paris Journak Those Fickle Aesthetes! It's Time to Erase Graffiti, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2000, at A4 ("Ten years ago, France debated the beauty of graffiti, with some
of its most prominent politicians defending graffiti writers as artists of the pop culture. Such
was the love affair with street art that exhibits sprang up around the country. One Paris mu-
seum even displayed a subway car covered with graffiti, along with videos of young spray
painters explaining just how they do it.").
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COURTESY OF GRAFFITI RESEARCH LAB,
WWW. GRAFFITIRESEARCHLAB.COM
Modern technology has altered the art of graffiti radically. Laser
graffiti is perhaps its latest iteration. Laser graffiti is a high-tech
version of its despised cousin that has remedied the most objective
element of graffiti-its permanence. Spray paint is difficult to re-
move and is time consuming to paint over. The concept of laser
graffiti is simple. The art operates much like the traditional family
slideshow, but permits the practitioner considerable artistic flexi-
bility. By connecting a laptop to a digital image projector, which
the artists use to capture the trail of the laser pointer and to pro-
ject it, the artist can point the laser pointer directly on the object
where the image will be displayed and draw.45 But like an Etch-A-
Sketch, the artist can erase a message and then produce another.
The technique effectively replicates traditional graffiti. And like
traditional graffiti, it can be done anywhere and everywhere.
Unlike traditional graffiti, however, it can be done on a massive
scale. By altering the distance between the projector and the sur-
face towards which the image is directed, the artist can create
enormous images. For example, graffiti artists in Rotterdam have
45. For instructions on creating laser graffiti, see Theodore Watson, GRL Laser
Tag Rotterdam-How to and Source Code, http://muonics.net/blog/
index.php?postid=15 (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
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produced laser graffiti on the sides of buildings visible at great dis-
tances.46
The legal issues are somewhat novel. First, does laser graffiti
constitute a trespass? If not, is it a nuisance? Detractors might ar-
gue that artists commit a trespass by shining a laser beam at a
building and projecting light onto it. Laser pointers are potentially
dangerous for the eyes, while the projector light threatens to dis-
turb and harass occupants. The practice raises interesting speech
issues. If laser graffiti constitutes neither a trespass nor a nuisance,
can a building be made to speak? That is to say, should the owner
of the building have a right not to be associated with the speech or
art displayed on his or her property? What would be the result if
graffiti artists were to broadcast "End War!" on the side of the Pen-
tagon?
D. ImprovEverywhere
ImprovEverywhere is an improvisational theatre group whose
self-proclaimed mission is to "cause scenes."A Founded by improv
comic Charlie Todd, ImprovEverywhere stages "missions" (or
"stunts") whose aim seems to be to raise eyebrows. The group's
missions have made national news in recent years. ImprovEvery-
where organized the pantless ride on the subways of New York City.
It also made headlines when it stationed a bathroom attendant in
the lavatory of a mid-town New York City McDonald's, an unex-
pected presence which flummoxed guests with comedic results.
46. Id. (showing picture of message broadcast on large building visible across a river
from at least one mile away).
47. See Improv Everywhere, http://improveverywhere.com (on file with the University
of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
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Other stunts are less overtly funny, but rather appear merely in-
tended to confuse and or annoy. For example, the group
organized roughly eighty participants (termed "agents") who
invaded the chain electronics store Best Buy. Each agent wore a
blue shirt and khaki pants (similar to the uniforms of Best Buy
employees). The agents did not purport to impersonate employees
per se, but merely stood quietly or milled around the store to
observe the reaction of customers and management.
Management did take notice, and a police encounter resulted,
though none of the group was apparently arrested. More recently,
in conjunction with NBC, the group showed up at a California
Little League game along with cheering fans, a jumbotron, and a
Goodyear blimp ... just to create a scene. They also assembled 700
agents along the Brooklyn Bridge with cameras to create a "wave of
light" that cascaded across the East River as each agent took a
picture in timed succession.
The "missions" are hard to describe. The group has no
self-described political or countercultural message. ImprovEvery-
where's stunts may be funny, or serious, or just weird. The desire to
reclaim public space united ImprovEverywhere's agenda.4' Accord-
ing to Todd, "[i] f giant corporations can slap ads all over town, we
should be able to blanket the city with comedy."49 Although the
group's founder maintains that he focuses on comedy rather than
48. Dan Avery, Street Fighters, TIME OUT N.Y., Aug. 9-15, 2007 (on file with the Univer-
sity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.timeout.com/
newyork/articles/museums-culture/i 1056/street-fighters.
49. Id.
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the culture jam, ImprovEverywhere's "missions" frequently have
that effect.
50
Particularly notable is their 2007 mission in Grand Central Sta-
tion in New York City. Gathering two hundred agents, they entered
the train station with one objective-to freeze in place for five
minutes. With no direction from the group's leadership, agents
froze in various positions: consulting a map, tying a shoelace, hold-
ing hands, kissing, eating, looking at the clock, etc. Predictably, the
reactions of passersby varied. Some did not seem to notice. Others
stared, took pictures, or tried to goad the frozen agents into mov-
ing. One employee driving a maintenance cart found his path
obstructed and appeared to call for backup. However, the stunt
ended before anyone came to his aid. Viewing the mission from
the videotape ImprovEverywhere shot and posted on its website is
an eerie experience. Two-hundred frozen objects below the bejew-
eled ceiling of Grand Central Station with scores of busy New
Yorkers moving past creates a live canvas of sorts. The stunt created
an enchanting agglomeration of movement and stillness-a high-
tech version of the beauty and energy of a Kandinsky painting at
the expense of the New York Metropolitan Transit Authority.
This stunt raises interesting questions about art and property,
and presents yet another form of trespassory art. Unlike the
group's missions in McDonalds and Best Buy-private spaces
where owners can have unwanted visitors removed-Grand Central
Station is effectively a public space. Thus, its owners cannot ex-
clude undesirable guests as easily. Of course, were a person to
chain him or herself to a train, the city and the railroad would have
recourse to remove, arrest, and detain the person for disorderly
conduct. ImprovEverywhere's stunts are certainly not welcome at
Grand Central. But the group's use of the terminal is not particu-
larly inconsistent with the functioning of the train station.
Travelers frequently stop to look at maps, talk on their mobile
phones, or just people-watch. In other words, the stunt arguably
caused no harm. Does the use become trespassory or impermissi-
ble where the loitering is organized and deliberate? A reasonable,
content-neutral speech regulation5 ' at the terminal prohibiting
50. See Adam M. Bright & Ramona Rosales, Agent Provocateur, GOOD, Dec. 8, 2006,
http://www.goodmagazine.com/section/Portraits/Agent Provocateur (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
51. As will be discussed later in the Article, Grand Central Terminal might qualify as a
public forum (areas such as parks or sidewalks which have historically been open to free
speech) or a limited public forum (a government-owned area that the government has open
for speech purposes) because of open access. However, because of safety concerns and inso-
far as the city has previously restricted speech activities at the station, it might also be
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individuals from obstructing movement might pass constitutional
muster under the existing free-speech analysis. However, such an
approach would also threaten to interfere with creative and
minimally obstructive performances by groups such as
ImprovEverywhere.
E. Parkour
Sonia Katyal, in an innovative and perceptive article, addressed
culture jamming in her critique of intellectual property law.12
Katyal describes the culture jammer's method: to "introduce noise
into the signal as it passes from transmitter to receiver, encourag-
ing idiosyncratic, unintended interpretations."5  The cultural
interference Katyal terms "semiotic disobedience" converts "a pri-
vate act of criminal rebellion into a publicly declarative act of
consumer rehabilitation."54 Like the BLF's transformation of a
McDonald's advertisement into a pithy retort mocking the fast-
food giant, these practitioners of trespassory art produce direct
and simple messages that can be easily understood by onlookers.
But not all trespassory art effects a culture jam. As ImprovEvery-
where's missions suggest, trespassory art can be decidedly abstract
or ambiguous. The meaning of the group's stunt in Grand Central
Station may have been beautiful, intriguing, or just plain odd (de-
pending on who you ask). But any onlooker would agree that it
lacked an identifiable political message. Like a Cezanne still-life,
trespassory art can represent art for art's own sake, with no hidden
or overt meanings. Indeed, possibly the most socially valuable
forms of trespassory art are those that avoid the political in favor of
the overtly artistic.
Like ImprovEverywhere, but to an even greater degree, our final
example falls into this category of abstract trespassory art. It is the
worldwide phenomenon known as "parkour," or "free running."55Parkour resembles the French word for "obstacle course."56 Its fol-
considered a non-public forum, in which case speech restrictions are subject to less exacting
scrutiny.
52. Katyal, supra note 2, at 489-90, 511-12.
53. Id. at 511 (quoting DERY, supra note 22).
54. Id. at 520 (citing Vandalism is Art, ADBUSTERS MAG., Spring 2000, at 45 (based on a
philosophical essay by Andrew Stillman)).
55. Parkour and free running are different disciplines, but share many similarities. For
this reason, and because they pose similar questions about art and trespass, they will be dealt
with together.
56. See American Parkour, Extended: What Is Parkour?, http://
wwi.americanparkour.com/content/view/10/27/ (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
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lowers also describe it as "l'art du deplacement' (the art of displace-
ment). The characterization is apt. Practitioners of parkour-who
call themselves "traceurs"-aim to overcome obstacles quickly and
efficiently using the human body. What may look to some as an
adult attempting to relive the glory days of his or her youth at the
jungle gym, as a traceur leaps from object to object, surmounting
concrete barriers in an effort to move smoothly from point A to
point B, is in reality something much more sophisticated.
Parkour was created in the Parisian suburb of Lisses by David
Belle, with the help of his childhood friend Sebastian Foucan.
Foucan developed a related genre, known as "free running.,
5
1
Parkour and free running are frequently described as "extreme
sports," for they place participants at risk of grave injury. But for
those who practice each discipline, they are more like a method-
ology, a way of life, or a "gruelling [sic] meditative pursuit. 0 8
Parkour and free running utilize a series of defined moves and
jumps, mastery of which contributes to the achievement of a
traceur's goal-the efficient and unthinking surmounting of
physical obstacles. Traceurs train relentlessly to master the series of
moves, link them up into a seamless flow, and become "sufficiently
fluent so that [they] can cross any terrain in flight without com-
promise. "59 As such, parkour is an expression of utilitarianism:
achieving an objective in the most direct, effortless way. Maximum
output for minimal input.
Parkour and free running are disciplines that emphasize a rela-
tionship with the site. For traceurs, each motion-there is an
identifiable vocabulary for parkour's major moves-represents "a
physical recodification of space, thereby allowing otherwise disen-
franchised expression."6 ° The way traceurs overcome obstacles with
efficiency and determination evokes feelings in the actor and the
observer both. Parkour's messages, unlike most speech, are non-
propositional.'
Nevertheless, parkour's messages signify a defiance of existing
boundaries and space. Consider, for example, the free running
exhibition Foucan and his colleagues performed in London for
the BBC documentary Jump London. The documentary illustrated a
57. Alec Wilkinson, No Obstacles, NEw YORKER, Apr. 16, 2007, at 106.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 107.
60. Tyler Coulson, This is Parkour!: First Amendment Protection of Non-Propositional
Expression with Property Implications 39 (Dec. 7, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
61. See generally RANDALL P. BEZANSON, ART AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (2009) (discuss-
ing the distinction between propositional and non-propositional expression in the artistic
context).
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difference between free running and parkour, which emphasizes
efficiency to a lesser degree in favor of reconceptualizing physical
space. 2 Foucan performed a handstand on the handrail of an exte-
rior balcony of the Royal Museum in London, four or five stories
up. With the counsel of a professional stunt team, he also per-
formed a jump from the bridge of a British battleship moored in
the Thames, and in separate video jumped across the widening gap
of the retractable roof of Millennium Stadium in Cardiff. Foucan's
moves do not epitomize efficiency-there is nothing inherently
efficient about the handstand-but rather emphasize the redefini-
tion of space. Highlighting the distinction between parkour and
free running illustrates the expressive content in each. For the
traceur, whether of parkour or free running, what is important is
the harmony the expression creates between the traceur and the
object he or she seeks to overcome.
In this sense, parkour presents an application of site-specific
art.63 Site specificity, as an idea, grew out of the minimalist move-
61
ment of the 1950s and 1960s. Minimalism sought to reduce art to
its fundamental components-to illustrate what lay at its core.
Minimalist art, like site-specific art and parkour, is introspective in
this way. Site specificity accepts the proposition that "the meanings
of utterances, actions and events are affected by their 'local posi-
tion,' by the situation of which they are a part," and that a work of
art can be "defined in relation to its place and position. 65 The
most famous example of site-specific art was Richard Serra's Tilted
Arc. A General Services Administration ("GSA") commission, Serra
designed the artwork, a lengthy sheet of warped iron for a particu-
lar location, Federal Plaza, a popular lunch spot for employees
working in downtown New York City. The complaints about the
sculpture, which bisected the plaza, grew so vociferous that the
GSA decided to remove it. That decision spawned a lengthy court
battle (which the GSA eventually won) and landmark legislation
protecting the rights of artists in the integrity of their work.66
62. Coulson, supra note 60, at 19-20.
63. Site specificity is, we argue, important to each of the examples of trespassory art we
describe.
64. See HARRIET F. SENIE, THE TILTED ARC CONTROVERSY: A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT?
76 (2002).
65. NICK KAYE, SITE-SPECIFIC ART: PERFORMANCE, PLACE AND DOCUMENTATION 1
(2000).
66. The United States had not until this time protected so-called "moral rights" of art-
ists, long recognized in Europe. After the Serra controversy, which began in the mid-1980s,
Congress passed the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), which gave artists certain rights in the
integrity of their work. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006).
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Richard Serra argued that the art was inseparable from its loca-
tion. When confronting Tilted Arc, Serra argued that " [t] he viewer
becomes aware of himself, his environment, and his movement
through the plaza." 7 Serra designed the work to enhance the
plaza, just as the plaza enhanced the meaning of the work . Site
specificity thus creates a two-part dialogue linking the art with the
surroundings and the surroundings with the art: the two to be in-
separable. 9 Altering the location simultaneously changes the
meaning of the art and of the space.
It comes as no surprise, then, that parkour speaks particularly
loudly in the environments of its birth-the Parisian suburbs. In
the poorer areas of the suburban banlieues of the French capital,
where urban planners build apartment complexes into concrete
jungles, parkour may have special meaning. Practicing in this envi-
ronment, the traceur "rejects the concepts and constraints on life
that architects and urban planners have put into place, and in so
doing transforms space from an office plaza, or a park, into a can-
vas for expressive activity., 70 The essence of parkour and free
running is, in the words of Foucan, "il y a toujours un chemin pour
arriver d' ("there is always a path to arrive at") . 7' Foucan adds: "Le
parkour est un moyen de combattre, de combattre la peur Et, aprs, on peut
le retranscrire dans la vie." ("Parkour is a means of combating, of
combating fear. And, after, one can apply that to life.") 2
The aesthetic message of parkour may be difficult to grasp. The
exercise of autonomy in parkour and the expressive character of its
component movements may be apparent to the practitioner, but
difficult for the observer to detect. Watching any of the innumer-
able parkour demonstrations available on YouTube or the
documentaries on the sport, however, provides some insight in to
the power of the art form. For example, one critic commented on
Foucan's free running exhibition in London, in which he per-
formed on some of the capital's most venerated buildings. Foucan's
performance at the Royal Albert Hall, he argued, "corrupted" the
67. Barbara Hoffman, Law for Art's Sake in the Public Realm, in ART AND THE PUBLIC
SPHERE 113, 116 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1992).
68. SENIE, supra note 64, at 79.
69. See Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 2d 89, 95 (D. Mass. 2003),
affd, 459 F.3d 128 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting that the theory of site-specific art holds that "be-
cause the location defines the art, site-specific sculpture is destroyed if it is moved from the
site" and finding that because the location of the sculpture was an essential element of its
message, removal would constitute alteration within the meaning of the Visual Artists Rights
Act (VARA)).
70. Coulson, supra note 60, at 40.
71. Jump London (Channel Four (United Kingdom) television broadcast Sept. 9, 2003),
available at http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=461185990931808314.
72. Id.
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building's original use. 3 The performance was site specific in this
way. Accordingly, the less well-suited a particular location is to
parkour or free running, the more powerful the venue is as a plat-
form for expression. The incongruity of parkour's presence in a
location provides its expressive power. Parkour emphasizes free-
dom and expresses the belief that "[n]o obstacle, no barrier, no
restraint can stop the traceur; they continue moving forward in
spite of, and in harmony with these."74 According to one North
American practitioner of parkour, parkour is "a means of reclaim-
ing what it means to be a human being. It teaches us to move using
the natural methods that we should have learned from infancy. It
teaches us to touch the world and interact with it, instead of being
sheltered by it."7"
Cities and towns in the United States are only now beginning to
ban parkour-type activities, along with skateboarding for public
spaces, but parkour and free running have not gone unnoticed on
76the big screen . Foucan starred in the opening minutes of a recent
James Bond film, Casino Royale, as a villain who uses parkour/free
running to escape from a chasing Daniel Craig, playing Bond. The
French film director Luc Besson cast Belle in a leading role in his
2004 film Banlieue 13. A film slated for 2010, entitled Parkour, will
tell the tale of an undercover New York police officer who infil-
trates the world of parkour to catch a group of bank robbers.
Because of the ease by which directors can integrate it into any
one of the multi-million dollar action movies Hollywood produces
each summer, parkour's appeal on the big screen is undeniable.
The difficulty of parkour from a legal perspective, by contrast, is its
abstraction. Does parkour merit protection under the First
Amendment or otherwise where its expressive qualities are so ab-
stract? If parkour is about efficiency and free running about the
recodification of space, does a Foucan abre droit (handstand) pro-
vide different meaning from a Foucan saut (jump)? Like the
Rothko painting, artistic expression can be difficult to describe,
but it still retains its expressive content.
73. Id.; see Coulson, supra note 60.
74. See Extended: What Is Parkour?, supra note 56.
75. An Tran, Two Theories on Parkour Philosophy, PARKOUR N. Am., Sept. 7, 2007, http://
parkournorthamerica.com/plugins/content/content.php?content.17 (on file with the Uni-
versity of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
76. Wilkinson, supra note 57, at 116.
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"The traceur rejects the concepts and constraints on life that ar-
chitects and urban planners have put into place, and in so doing
transforms space from an office plaza, or a park, into a canvas for
expressive activity."" As the genre thus emphasizes the physical re-
codification of space and rejects property limitations, trespass is
closely intertwined with parkour. For the traceur, how better to
achieve these objectives than by rejecting the landowner's right to
exclusive possession of land?
One may overemphasize the importance of site specificity in
parkour, however. The importance of space and site in the
traceur's art is undeniable. As the performance at Royal Albert
Hall and elsewhere reminds us, that message differs as the parkour
artist performs in public vs. private space, etc. But are these differ-
ences significant? On the one hand, yes. Viewers appreciate an
entirely different aesthetic sensibility when observing acrobatics
and other parkour/free running moves performed on Shake-
speare's Globe Theater than in an ordinary public park. Because of
the Globe's unique identity, a place where one would not expect a
person to be found leaping from the rafters, the traceur sparks a
77. Coulson, supra note 60, at 23.
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two-way conversation about space, site, and use that he or she can-
not replicate in the park setting. But as traceurs seek out new
spaces in which to perform, and as those efforts intrude into pro-
tected public or even private spaces, how do we determine when
the value of the artistic message prevails over a property owner's
interest in avoiding the intrusion? The limitations of site specificity
provide some insight. Consider the Winged Victory. This massive
sculpture, which now sits triumphantly at the top of a long staircase
near the entrance to the Louvre, was originally designed for a spe-
cific site, probably a Roman temple. Is the artistic message
distorted? Probably, but how do we measure that distortion, and is
it significant? These questions have received much scholarly atten-
tion in the disputes over the Elgin Marbles and other works of art
of unique cultural importance. No clear answers present them-
selves.
We return to a concrete example, to Sebastian Foucan and Jump
London. Recall that his free running on Royal Albert Hall was ex-
pressive for corrupting the original use of the building, and
derived artistic merit from that message. But Foucan and his crew
first received permission from the City of London. Determining
how the presence of consent altered the expression is tricky. One
can safely conclude, however, that the message changed. Instead of
"I reject the limitations of this space," Foucan expressed something
closer to "With your consent, I reject some of the limitations of this
space." Foucan, therefore, effectively conveyed a message despite
having obeyed existing property and land-use regulations. That
episode demonstrates that removing the trespassory element from
parkour/free running or other genres does not strip them entirely
of artistic content.
In summary, as this Article weighs the value of trespassory art
and how the legal system should accommodate it, the reader
should bear in mind the importance and limitations of site speci-
ficity. Trespass lies at the core of the art forms we have discussed.
These artists engage in a trespass in much, if not all, of their work.
But as to those works involving trespass, which we contend consti-
tute valuable expressive conduct, property and tort law present a
threat. Rules that entitle landowners to win damages for trespass
absent proof of any harm, and to injunctive relief barring continu-
ing and future artistic invasions, result, we contend, in the
unjustified suppression of valuable artistic expression. We propose
a new property/tort framework for dealing with the artistic tres-
pass. It is to articulating that new framework to which we now turn.
[VOL. 43:2
Trespassory Art
III. MODIFYING THE COMMON LAW OF REAL PROPERTY AND
TORT-TRESPASS, NUISANCE AND TRESPASSORY ART
In the following Sections, we outline our argument for modify-
ing the common law of real property and tort to accommodate
trespassory art. We propose that, in narrowly defined circum-
stances involving tangible invasions of private or public property
that qualify as trespassory art, courts should apply a modified tres-
pass analysis that borrows from the analytical framework of
nuisance law. Our approach makes room for a valuable, evolving
form of artistic expression. But, because it modifies the land-
owner's right to redress for injury to a nominal legal right absent a
showing of actual harm, it does not produce significant negative
externalities for property ownership. As prelude to this argument,
and to place the modern law of trespass in appropriate context, a
word about the origins of trespass is warranted.
A. Trespass and Nuisance in Historical Context
Before common law jurists developed the law of contract, they
defined the rights and duties of individuals in respect of the most
elemental and precious of commodities-land. Land was the
source of sustenance and wealth in Britain. It formed the basis of
the system of feudal tenures that developed following the imposi-
tion of Norman rule post-1066.
The common law developed various rules for descent and distri-
bution of estates, and for adjudicating disputes among individuals
with competing claims to land 8.7 A variety of remedies, termed
forms of action, evolved to protect an individual's interest in per-
sonal property and in land. Trespass was among them. Early
reports from the fourteenth century show that trespass was quasi-
criminal in character. The remedy was available for a host of civilS79T it
and criminal wrongs not amounting to felonies. jurists viewed the
disturbance of the right of possession of land as a breach of the
peace.80 From the plaintiffs perspective, trespass was particularly
78. SeeJoseph W. Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in the Free and Democratic Society,
94 CORNELL L. REv. 1009, 1020-31 (2009) (describing how the "estates" system bundled
various property rights together).
79. George F. Deiser, Development of Principle in Trespass, 27 YALE L.J. 220, 232-34
(1917-18).
80. 8 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 68.02(b) (David A. Thomas ed., 2005) ("A tres-
pass to land in early common law was perceived as a breach of the peace resulting from the
unlawful entry onto the land of another."). An action would be heard by the King's Bench
where plaintiff would allege that the defendant had committed the wrong against him "vi et
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flexible. Unlike the actions available to recover possession of land
after an ouster, trespass was available to plaintiffs whose interest in
possession had been disturbed but who remained in possession of
the land.8'
During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, trespass became
the "principal medium for disputing property rights."8 2 Control
and possession of land was "central to social relations and the ex-
ercise of power in the middle ages."83 Because the law held "the
property of every man so sacred, that no man can set foot upon his
neighbour's close without his leave," 84 the availability of a remedy
for the unlicensed entry on land was an "ineradicable compo-
nent[] of the deep structure of real property."85 The ability to
exclude was deemed essential to any meaningful understanding of
property rights.8 6 A willingness to recognize the inviolability of
property was a driving force in attracting settlers to the American
87colonies in the early days of our nation. The robust protection for
property rights in the common law thus easily found its way to
American shores.
From its common law antecedents, trespass in American law de-
veloped defined characteristics. As a theoretical matter, these
proved distinctive and easy to apply. Trespass vindicates the interest
in exclusive use and possession of real property. It provides a rem-
edy for "direct" invasions of land. The right to redress arises not for
armis" and "against the king's peace." George Woodbine, The Origins of the Action of Trespass,
Part II, 34 YALE L.J. 345, 358 (1925); see also FREDERICK G. KEMPIN, JR., HISTORICAL INTRO-
DUCTION TO ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 166 (2d ed. 1973).
81. 4JOHN BAKER, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 723 (2003).
82. Id. at 720. Trespass by that time had splintered into three distinct actions: vi et ar-
mis (with force and arms), corresponding to trespass to the person; de bonis asportatis (taking
of goods), corresponding to trespass to chattels; and quare clausum fregit (breaching the
close), corresponding to trespass to real property. KEMPIN, supra note 80, at 167.
83. John Hudson, Anglo-Norman Land Law and the Origins of Property, in LAW AND Gov-
ERNMENT IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND AND NORMANDY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SIRJAMES HOLT 198
(George Garnett &John Hudson eds., 1994).
84. Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 817 (KB.).
85. KEVIN GRAY & SUSAN FRANCIS GRAY, ELEMENTS OF LAND LAW § 3.53 (4th ed.
2004). William Blackstone described the property right as "that sole and despotic dominion
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion
of the right of any other individual in the universe." 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAR-
IES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (1766).
86. Compare Thomas Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REv. 730
(1998) (describing right to exclude as sine qua non of property right), with Shyamkrishna
Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions,
31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 593, 595-97 (2008) (suggesting that a property right means
more than the right to exclude).
87. JAMES ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT 25 (2d ed. 1997); see also
S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 288 (2d ed. 1981) (describ-
ing trespass under English law).
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the damage to the land, but for the interference with the land-
owner's right to exclude.8s The common law viewed the violation of
the right to exclude and to exclusive possession with sufficient
alarm to award the successful plaintiff damages without regard to
actual injury.8 9 Because the law presumes damages from trespass,
the plaintiff need only prove an intentional, unexcused intrusion.9°
Injunctive relief is available where the plaintiff can demonstrate a
likelihood of future harm.9 No showing of actual harm to the land
is necessary.9 2 One who enters the land of another may be liable
even if he thinks the land is his own, or reasonably believes that he
is otherwise privileged to enter.9 Trespass is a harsh remedy, impos-
ing liability without fault.94 The modern trespass remedy is "colored
by its past, and the idea that the peace of the community was put in
danger by the trespasser's conduct influenced the courts' idea of
the character of the tort.,95 Its rigidity reflects the importance of
land rights to the social and political order. In the aggrieved land-
owner's entitlement to damages without proof of harm, however,
we see a vestigial trait of trespass's medieval past.
96
The cause of action for nuisance evolved alongside that of tres-
pass, but in a different direction. Although Prosser has described
nuisance as the most "impenetrable jungle" in the law, its basic
88. See, e.g.,Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 159 (Wis. 1997); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 163 cmt. d (1965) ("The wrong for which a remedy is
given under the rule stated in this Section consists of an interference with the possessor's
interest in excluding others from the land.").
89. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 163 cmt. d (1965) ("[E]ven a harmless en-
try or remaining, if intentional, is a trespass."); see also THOMPSON, supra note 80, at 235
("[T] he common law also assumed that... [trespass] resulted in damage to the property.").
90. Burger v. Singh, 816 N.Y.S.2d 478, 480 (App. Div. 2006) ("Furthermore, nominal
damages are presumed from a trespass even where the owner has suffered no actual injury
to his or her possessory interest."); Finlay v. Finlay, 856 P.2d 183, 190 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993).
Intention in the trespass context means what it does through the law of tort: the defendant
need only intend to commit the act that leads to the trespass, or know that it is substantially
certain to follow. She need not intend an unprivileged invasion.
91. See Brenner v. Heiler, 91 N.E. 744, 745 (Ind. Ct. App. 1910) ("A threatened distur-
bance to an owner's right of possession has been held to authorize an injunction.").
92. Polin v. Chung Cho, 8 Cal. App. 3d 673, 676 (Ct. App. 1970).
93. Jordan v. Stallings, 911 S.W.2d 653, 660 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 164 cmt. a (1965) ("If the actor is and intends to be upon the particular
piece of land in question, it is immaterial that he honestly and reasonably believes that he
has the consent of the lawful possessor to enter, or, indeed, that he himself is its possessor.").
94. See Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, 773 P.2d 1294, 1311 (Or. 1989) ("[T]respass does not
involve a weighing process; if an unprivileged intrusion invades the possessor's protected
interest in exclusive possession, strict liability for trespass results." (citing Davis v. Georgia-
Pacific, 445 P.2d 481 (Or. 1986))).
95. Martin v. Reynolds Metal Co., 342 P.2d 790, 796 (Or. 1959).
96. For a brilliant and cogent discussion of the theoretical changes over time in the
meaning of property and, inferentially, the nature of rights protected by trespass, see Singer,
supra note 78.
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dimensions are clear.97 While trespass provides a remedy for direct
invasions of land, nuisance is available for indirect entries. Trespass
protects the right to exclude; nuisance protects the landowner's
right to use and enjoyment of the land. No physical invasion is
necessary to maintain a nuisance action.98 Frequent examples of
nuisances include the odor of neighboring slaughterhouses or the
dust from the operation of a cement plant.99 The critical distinction
the common law drew between trespass and nuisance was that the
trespassory invasion must be both tangible and visible. Incorporeal,
invisible, or otherwise intangible entries on land could not support
an action in trespass.'00 An action for trespass would not lie for in-
vasions of light, vibration, or concussions of air originating from
adjacent land.
For our purposes, however, of particular importance is what
courts do not do when addressing a trespass claim-they do not
balance the plaintiff-landowner's use of the land against the de-
fendant's. 1 1 Trespass's rigidity stands in marked contrast to
nuisance. Courts decide nuisance claims by engaging in a compli-
cated balancing of interests. Under this balancing approach, a
nuisance is actionable where the defendant's conduct is the "legal
cause of an invasion of another's interest in the private use and
enjoyment of land" and "intentional and unreasonable.' '02 The in-
vasion must also be substantial. 3
The critical insight of nuisance is that the social utility of the de-
fendant's conduct matters to the analysis. Courts inquire whether
the harm the plaintiff suffers is significant, whether the particular
use or enjoyment interfered with is suited to the character of the
locality, and whether the defendant's conduct is suited to the char-
acter of that locality.0 4 Where the injury (or inconvenience) to the
97. KEETON ET AL., SUpra note 41, § 86.
98. See Wilson v. Interlake Steel Co., 649 P.2d 922, 924 (Cal. 1982) ("All intangible in-
trusions, such as noise, odor, or light alone, are dealt with as nuisance cases, not trespass."
(citations omitted)).
99. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y 1970) (nuisance arising
from operation of cement plant); Conway v. Gampel, 209 N.W. 562, 563 (Mich. 1926) (not-
ing that slaughterhouse in a residential neighborhood is a prima facie nuisance).
100. See Wilson, 649 P.2d at 924.
101. See, e.g., Davis v. Georgia-Pacific, 445 P.2d 481, 483 (Or. 1968) ("In a trespass case
the social value of defendant's conduct, its efforts to prevent the harm and other circum-
stances that tend to justify an intrusion cannot be considered by the trier of the facts" in
determining whether defendant's intrusion constitutes trespass.). This is the general rule.
See infra Part IV.C for a discussion of decisions in which courts have done the opposite.
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979).
103. Because the law does not concern itself with trifles, mere inconvenience to an ad-
joining landowner is not actionable in nuisance. See Northwest Water Corp. v. Pennetta, 479
P.2d 398 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F (1979).
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821F, 827-28 (1979).
[VOL. 43:2
WINTER 2010]
plaintiff is slight and the value of the defendant's conduct is sig-
nificant, the court will refuse to impose damages or an
injunction.' 5 Accordingly, nuisance law aims to achieve a balance
between competing uses for land that maximizes the land's pro-
ductive use.
We have not attempted a comprehensive discussion of trespass
or nuisance. But our abbreviated discussion demonstrates the criti-
cal distinctions between the two. The former developed in
response to the need, apparent in feudal times, to protect the right
to exclusive use and possession of land. Because land was at the
heart of the system of government, strict rules ensured sociopoliti-
cal cohesion and continuity. As nuisance protects a right common
law judges deemed less critical to the orderly functioning of soci-
ety, they permitted a case-by-case balancing to determine the rights
of competing claimants to the use of land.
B. A New Legal Framework for Trespassory
Art-Reframing Trespass
In the pages that follow, we address two causes of action, trespass
and nuisance, in an artistic context. Recalling the earlier examples
of what we term "trespassory art," we address how these twin reme-
dies should accommodate trespassory art. We attempt to
demonstrate that the theoretical distinctions between trespass and
nuisance outlined above, while rigid in theory, are not as neat in
practice. Rather, courts have applied these remedies flexibly in re-
sponse to the changing needs of society. These changes have been
incremental in some cases, and fairly radical in others. We propose
that courts modify the common law to accommodate another
change. Trespassory art represents a type of expressive conduct
that the current rules of property law and tort suppress unnecessar-
ily. Trespassory art is valuable. Accordingly, we propose that the law
of tort, and its remedies for the intentional intrusion on land, ac-
commodate a limited privilege in the case of trespass for artistic
purposes.
105. "Nuisance is the unreasonable, unusual, or unnatural use of one's property so that
it substantially impairs the right of another to peacefully enjoy his property." Frank v. Envi-
ronmental Sanitation Mgmt., Inc., 687 "S.W.2d 876, 880 (Mo. 1982) (citing Crutcher v.
Taystee Bread Co., 174 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. 1943)). Where the interference is not unreason-
able, there is no nuisance. See Boyne v. Town of Glastonbury, 955 A.2d 645, 655 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2008) (finding that plaintiff failed on claim of private nuisance because he failed to
present any evidence showing that the town's storm drainage system constituted unreason-
able interference with his land).
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1. Why Trespassory Art?
Trespass imposes a form of strict liability for intentional intru-
sions on real property. However, courts have avoided imposing
trespass liability in a mechanical fashion in order to effectuate
competing policy objectives. These courts have done so by means
of a context-sensitive balancing approach resembling (explicitly or
implicitly) nuisance. We argue that trespassory art warrants greater
protection, and justifies importing the utility-balancing analysis of
nuisance law to modify the strict liability elements of trespass.
Why does trespassory art call for this modification? The law now
prevents a private citizen who wishes to express a political opinion
from entering on private property, and most government property,
and doing so. Why should trespassory art be treated differently?0 6
An individual wishing to engage in political expression, to choose
but one example, may generally do so with great effect from a
number of locations-whether it be a street corner, a park, or the
internet. 10 7 And the art, by contrast, constitutes an "individual act of
liberty and free will" which deserves protection not only for the
effect it has on the viewer, but also for the importance of the ex-
pressive act for the artist and audience--especially the importance
of the audience's act of ascribing idiosyncratic meaning.08 Trespas-
sory art, as we define it, differs from political speech, because it
asserts a connection with a place. '0 9 The examples of trespassory art
we discuss above either: (i) use the trespassory intrusion as a vehi-
cle to convey meaning or (ii) employ the location in aid of the
expression. Thus, unlike the political campaign sign or the paint-
ing meant to hang in a museum, trespassory artists present a
special claim of access to real property for expressive purposes.
Our proposal intends to accommodate this unique type of expres-
sion.
We argue that where art offers social value and connects with
place, courts should modify their approach to trespassory art. The
106. As discussed in a later part, we do not claim that analogous privilege claims could
not be made for more cognitive speech acts. They could. But for reasons we outline later, we
also believe that the nature of such speech claims and the criteria applicable to their adjudi-
cation will be sufficiently distinct to justify our not addressing them here. See infra Part V.
107. This is, of course, not true in every case. See Lloyd Corp. V. Whiffen, 773 P.2d 1294
(Or. 1989).
108. BEZANSON, supra note 61, at 277-96.
109. We believe this generally to be the case. Of course, giving a speech on race rela-
tions will be more impactful in Birmingham, Alabama than in Fargo, North Dakota. The
trespassory art we describe, however, takes site specificity beyond where most political
speech does. Trespassory art uniquely incorporates not only site into the expression, but also
the fact of the trespass to the site.
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uniqueness of the artistic form of expression, the inability of the art-
ist and landowner to bargain effectively, and the fundamental
incompatibility of the art form with the type of private ordering that
a mechanical rule like trespass seeks to encourage all justify treating
trespassory art as a special case. Trespass imposes per se liability-
automatic entitlement to nominal damages with the prospect of in-
junctive relief. Because the virtues of that aspect of the trespass
remedy lie primarily in the action's feudal past, we argue that the
nuisance analysis furnishes the better analytical filter for addressing
competing uses for land. The availability of automatic damages is a
vestigial characteristic of the common law, one that should not pre-
vail in the face of burgeoning avenues of expression.
Applying the remedies available for trespass-damages without
proof of harm and injunctive relief-against an artist for whom the
invasion is a critical element of the expression silences a range of
unique expression. For the traceur, performing on the property of
another imbues the act with a message of freedom and expresses
the traceur's ability to overcome all obstacles. ImprovEverywhere's
mission in Grand Central Station put on a beautiful spectacle and
conveyed a message of collective obstructionism by their defiance
of social rules for behavior in public spaces. The expressiveness of
the trespassory character of these examples-particularly park-
our-can be abstract and elusive. But the movements are
meaningful, either on the cognitive or non-cognitive level. As a le-
gal matter, the emotive elements of art are equally as important as
its cognitive message.'10 As the Supreme Court has said about the
First Amendment, the Constitution does not simply protect expres-
sive conduct conveying a "particularized message," but also
expression such as the "painting of Jackson Pollack, music of Ar-
nold Schoenberg, orJabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll." ''
We argue that a modification of the common law remedies
available in trespass actions is necessary to accommodate this valu-
able art. Such a change is warranted for two reasons. First, as we
have discussed above, trespassory art has independent artistic and
expressive value." 2 The extant legal regime makes insufficient al-
lowance for this type of art. Second, trespassory art fits into a larger
class of expressive communication and conduct that seeks an
110. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (stating that "[t]he emotive impact of
speech on its audience is not a 'secondary effect"' unrelated to the content of the expres-
sion itself).
111. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995) (citations omitted).
112. See supra Part II (describing various examples of trespassory art and their expres-
sive capacities).
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outlet in the face of rules that regulate or suppress it. The art this
Article describes fits into what one commentator refers to as a
"vastly underappreciated phenomenon that underlies the dynamic
relationship between art and law" and that "shatter[s] the law's
presumed distinction between speaker and audience, between
protected speech and unprotected conduct, and between the ex-
pressive functions of real and intellectual property."" 1
3
Much of this regulation is, of course, eminently sensible.
Through its enumeration of three "fora" of public property for
purposes of expression-public, limited public, and non-public-
the Supreme Court has attempted to balance society's need for or-
der in its public affairs with the freedom of expression guaranteed
under the Constitution."4 We as a society could not function if
individuals could justify murder, battery, and other crimes as pro-
tected First Amendment expression. 115 The Court has accordingly
voided government regulations when they suppress expression for
an invalid purpose-based on its viewpoint or content, for exam-
ple-or because the secondary effects of the speech cannot justify
the restriction.1
6
Under forum analysis, avenues for public, artistic expression are
limited. Except for what the law considers to be traditional forums
for public expression-sidewalks and parks-the government has
wide latitude to restrict speech when it can articulate a non-speech
based reason for its actions.1 7 Whether the speech is busking on a
subway platform,"8 displaying art in federal buildings,"9 creating
113. Katyal, supra note 2, at 569.
114. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(noting that courts balance public interest in protecting speech when weighing constitutional-
ity).
115. Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) ("[V]iolence or other types
of potentially expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their communica-
tive impact ... are entitled to no constitutional protection."); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982) ("The First Amendment does not protect violence.").
116. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (finding suppression of
nude dancing not a violation of the First Amendment because it was not directed at suppress-
ing expression, but at public nudity); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (reversing
conviction of flag burner because criminal statute prohibiting flag desecration was directed at
expression, and was not content neutral); City of Renton vs. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S.
41 (1986) (finding that an ordinance that prohibited adult entertainment within a certain
distance from schools, churches, etc. was not designed to suppress expression, but to eliminate
undesirable social effects of adult theaters).
117. See, e.g., Sefick v. United States, No. 98-C5301, 1999 WL 778588 (N.D. Ill. May 6,
1999) (upholding GSA decision not to display artwork featuring Monica Lewinsky in federal
building because of disruption it would create).
118. SeeJones v. City of Chicago, No. 99 C 6082, 2000 WL 1139904 (N.D. III Aug. 10, 2000).
119. See, e.g., Claudio v. United States, 836 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D.N.C. 1993) (finding that
revocation of license of artist to display art in federal building did not violate the First
Amendment when art turned out to be a portrait of a nude woman undergoing abortion).
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art on the sidewalk, 120 or photographing hordes of nude models on
city streets, 21 artists constantly run up against government regula-
tion of their expressive outlets. Trespassory art fits into this larger
category of regulated expression.
With an awareness of the goal and the expressive elements of
trespassory art, critics might raise an obvious counter-argument:
does the proposed modification, by eliminating the trespass, elimi-
nate the expressive message that makes the art unique? We answer
no. As we outline below, our proposal is not to eliminate the un-
derlying tort or the trespass. The intentional, unprivileged invasion
of the real property of another remains trespassory-whether done
for artistic purposes, or for some other reason. We propose to alter
the remedies available for the trespass, denying the landowner the
right to certain relief where he or she suffers no harm from the
artistic invasion. Accordingly, the trespassory character of the ex-
pression remains. We merely modify how landowners can respond
to it.
Effecting an alteration to remedies for trespass on private and
public property gives a voice to those who unsuccessfully seek to
express their message in public. 2 2 Expanding the outlets for mean-
ingful artistic expression is a public good. Where that can be done
without harm to property owners, which we argue it can, it should
be done.
2. Refraining Trespass for Art
We have identified why the law of real property and tort should
accommodate trespassory art. We next address how courts should
modify trespass to protect the art form.
Before our modified trespass analysis should apply, we contend,
a court must determine that the trespassory art indeed qualifies as
such. We view qualifying trespassory art as art that: (i) is expressive
and (ii) asserts a meaningful connection to place.1 2 4 Trespassory art
120. People v. Bissinger, 625 N.Y.S.2d 823 (Crim. Ct. 1994).
121. Tunick v. Safir, No. 99 Civ. 5053(HB), 1999 WL 511852 (S.D.N.Y July 19, 1999).
122. See, e.g., Bissinger, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 823.
123. If our analysis that increasing the contribution of artists to society can be accom-
plished without harming property owners, then the result is pareto-optimal. See Specialty
Tires of America, Inc. v. CIT Group/Equipment Fin. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 434, 438 n.8 (W.D.
Pa. 2000) (defining pareto-optimality as "an adjustment that makes some parties better off
and none worse off than they were initially." (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALY-
SIS OF LAW § 4.5 (5th ed. 1998))).
124. As we discuss infra text accompanying notes 266-270, we propose that juries de-
termine whether the challenged art constitutes qualifying trespassory art.
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that meets these criteria, we argue, merits consideration under a
modified analytical framework. Having deemed the artistic inva-
sion to be "qualifying" trespassory art, the court must then measure
the harm the landowner suffers from the intrusion. Where "quali-
fying" trespassory art effects an invasion from which the landowner
suffers no harm, or where such harm is de minimis (i.e., premised
solely on the violation of the landowner's exclusive right of posses-
sion), damages should not follow, nor should injunctive relief
absent a showing of specific injury.
The first criterion of the initial qualification analysis may be eas-
ily satisfied. Most non-obscene art offers or evokes a message or
furnishes some non-cognitive aesthetic of appreciable value. The
second criterion is the critical variable. As an element of artistic
expression, site specificity provides a basis for trespassory art. The
examples we discuss in the introduction occupy what Sonia Katyal
terms "semiotic disobedience," or "spaces for political expression
carved outside the boundaries of protected speech.' 25 The expres-
sive disobedience Katyal describes takes many forms. The law can
and should make room for the narrow subset of these forms we
identify-those that appropriate and recode signals with respect to
real property. From an artistic perspective, the connection between
the idea and the site justifies the intrusion. Art that asserts a con-
nection with a particular place is unique. Site specificity answers
the question: "why this property?"
Site specificity offers a principled basis for distinguishing tres-
passory art from the host of other communicative activities for
which individuals might seek to access private property. Just as the
threshold requirements for conduct to qualify as symbolic speech
serve a gatekeeping role, so too does site specificity constrain the
availability of the modified trespass analysis. 126 Site specificity ex-
plains why "alternative avenues for communication," such as parks
or sidewalks, may indeed present no alternatives at all. We view our
five examples of trespassory art as each asserting a claim to place.
The examples we have identified in Part II do not, of course,
exhaust the range of artistic endeavors whose site specificity justify
displacing an exclusionary legal rule. People v. Bissinger, in which a
New York State court recognized the value of site specificity, illus-
trates the point.17 The court reversed the conviction of a
125. Katyal, supra note 2, at 510.
126. The Court has emphasized two factors in order for symbolic conduct to warrant
protection: "An intent to convey a particularized message was present, and in the surround-
ing circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those
who viewed it." Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974).
127. 625 N.Y.S.2d 823 (Crim. Ct. 1994).
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photographer for taking photographs of individuals at Times
Square for money without a vendor license. 28 Highlighting factors
that suggested that the defendant was, in fact, engaged in "per-
formance art," the court rejected the prosecution's argument that
taking pictures of individuals on the street was the equivalent of a
"shoe shine or sharpening shears." 29 Rather, the defendant pro-
duced a "'festive' and joy[ous]' figurative and literal 'picture' of
New York City for tourists and others, 'in contrast to the cold, in-
different, rushing masses that often occupy our streets and
heighten a visitor's negative impression of our city."" 30 Even though
the prosecution argued that the defendant was merely taking snap-
shots of people for money, the court concluded that it could not
constitutionally apply the law to the vendor. Denying him street
access at Times Square "effectively closes off the only method for
defendant here to capture and communicate the idea he assertedly
wishes to express-a performance and photographic memoraliza-
tion, with street audience participation in a bustling street
setting."13 ' No alternative sites were available because he "could not
purchase the atmosphere of a particular Times Square area street
corner at any price.' 1 2 The site specificity of the expression, in
Bissinger's case, made the expression worthy of First Amendment
protection against attempts by New York authorities to regulate it.
Our argument, though it has constitutional implications that we
survey in Part IV below, does not depend on the First Amend-
ment. 33 The change in the common law this Article proposes finds
justification in the comparatively inutile relief trespass offers for
legally cognizable, but often illusory, injury.
The law, of course, should not facilitate all types of trespassory
expression claimed to be artistic. Expression that does no more
than deface or vandalize is generally not artistically expressive or
socially valuable.3 4 It may carry a cognitive message, but it does not
128. Id.
129. Id. at 824-25.
130. Id. at 826.
131. Id. at 827.
132. Id.
133. See infra Part IV.
134. The line is fine, however. See generally Lior J. Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114
YALE L.J. 781 (2005) (describing how the act of destruction can be expressive). The distinc-
tion between vandalism and worthy trespassory art will be slippery. For example, an article
appeared recently on how skateboarders, equipped with a "gas-powered pump, five-gallon
buckets, shovels and a push broom," have taken over backyard pools left vacant across the
country from the wave of home foreclosures.Jesse McKinley & Malia Wollan, Skaters Jump in
as Foreclosures Drain the Poo4 N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2008, at Al. The skaters, the article re-
counts, risk trespass charges to play in the former icons of suburban success. Id. at A18.
Skateboarding is perhaps not artistic in the same way in which practitioners of parkour seek
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aesthetically reframe or re-represent space, place, or object.' s  It is
therefore not worth protecting as art from the blunt law of tres-
pass. Graffiti as "tagging" seeks merely to erase a message, or to
cover a message with another message. 1 6 The trespassory artist
instead seeks to borrow "visual legitimacy" from the message-
whether it is a billboard or a can of vegetables-incorporating the
message into a new message of the artist's making.1 37 These are art-
ists who trespass to beautify or alter harmlessly, whose work neither
detracts from the commercial value or viability of an enterprise.
This is art that turns a series of round haystacks in an empty field
into a large cigarette (unlighted), art that turns the side of an
otherwise ugly rail car into a futuristic landscape scene, art that
transforms solitary cans of Green Giant® peas into a work of imagi-
nation that defies description, or laser graffiti that transforms a
high-rise building into a message board.
Reorienting how courts deal with qualifying trespassory art does
not require a complete turnabout from orthodoxy. Real property
and tort law already intrude in various ways on the right of exclu-
sive possession. And courts have long been in the business of
reordering property rules. 138 Courts have modified the law of tres-
pass and nuisance as new public policy challenges have forced the
law to adjust. The discussion that follows demonstrates that there is
more room for our proposed modification than might at first ap-
pear.
We will first turn to limitations on the right to exclude that the
common law already recognizes, and those new ones that courts
have created. We rely in particular on these decisions for support.
Second, we analogize our proposal with the fair use defense to
copyright infringement. Third, we address and respond to per-
ceived objections from the law and economics movement. Finally,
we discuss in greater depth elements of our proposed modification
of trespass.
their own performances. But the line separating the two, or other such examples, may prove
difficult to draw. The question, as we suggest, is for the jury.
135. See BEZANSON, supra note 61, at 277-96.
136. See Lori L. Hanesworth, Are They Graffiti Artists or Vandals? Should They Be Able or
Caned?: A Look at the Latest Legislative Attempts to Eradicate Graffiti, 6 DEPAuL-LCA J. ART &
ENT. L. & POL'Y 225, 226 (1996) (describing gang graffiti as one type of graffiti, and consist-
ing of "primitive scrawls focusing on the gang name or symbol" intended to "mark territory,
to insult other gangs, to warn away intruders.").
137. Katyal, supra note 2, at 514-15 (quoting KLEIN, supra note 38, at 281). Klein states:
"The most sophisticated culture jams are not stand-alone ad parodies but interceptions-
counter-messages that hack into a corporation's own method of communication to send a
message starkly at odds with the one that was intended." KLEIN, supra note 38, at 281.
138. See, e.g., Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790 (Or. 1959) (a case described
infra in which the court reexamines trespass and nuisance).
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3. Property, Tort and the Flexibility of the Common Law
Earlier we discussed the development of the trespass remedy.
139
We explained why the common law provided, in the case of an of-
fense to the right to exclude, an exceptional remedy in damages
absent proof of harm. We contrasted trespass with nuisance, which
empowers courts to perform a fact specific balancing of competing
uses for land. The contrast between the two causes of action is
stark. Trespass is generally unsparing. But these rules of trespass
are not without exception. We turn first to the common law excep-
tions to the otherwise "inviolable" right to exclude. These
exceptions privilege uses that society has deemed valuable. Our
discussion highlights the ways in which, over time, the common law
has diluted the absolute nature of the right to exclude in favor of
alternative uses for the use of land. We highlight how the decisions
have melded (if not totally obliterated) the distinctions between
trespass and nuisance. The discussion demonstrates why we believe
the common law and modern-day courts have created room for the
change that we advance. It is no more adventuresome to shape the
remedies to accommodate trespassory art than it was for courts to
modify the law of trespass to meet the changing needs of com-
merce and society. 140 We thus attempt to fit the modification within
these precedents.
a. Holes in the Armor-Implied Balancing in the Modem Restrictions
on the Use of Land and the Right to Exclude
Courts have long conceived of property rights as original, fun-
damental, and inviolable. 4' But as Justice Holmes recognized, and
139. See supra text accompanying notes 78-96.
140. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530 (1884) ("This flexibility and capacity for
growth and adaptation is the peculiar boast and excellence of the common law.").
It is the glory of the common law that it is not a rigid, immutable code. On the con-
trary, it is a vital, living force that endows with the breath of life a body of practical
principles governing human rights and duties. These rules are subject to gradual
modification and continuous adjustment to changing social and economic conditions
and shifting needs of society. This characteristic is the life blood of the common law.
Caporaletti v. A-F Corp., 137 F. Supp. 14, 16 (D.D.C. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 240 F.2d 53
(D.C. Cir. 1957); see also Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REv. 193 (1890) ("Political, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new
rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the new demands of soci-
ety.").
141. See, e.g., CNL Resort Hotel v. City of Doral, 991 So.2d 417, 420 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2008) ("Private property rights have long been viewed as sacrosanct and fundamentally
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as every first-year law student knows, the property owner's "bundle
of rights" is never complete and absolute. 142 Benjamin Franklin
long ago recognized this truth when he commented that "Private
Property ... is a Creature of Society, and is subject to the Calls of
that Society, whenever its Necessities shall require it."'
43
Nuisance presents one obvious example of the truth of Frank-
lin's maxim. The right to be free from a nuisance is, in fact, a
property right. It entitles the holder to limit the use of property
of another. The principle sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas ("use
your property so as not to damage another's") has a long history in
domestic and international law.'4 5 Just as a landowner may be en-
joined under the law of nuisance from diverting rainwater from
her land onto that of another, the law imposes restrictions on the
landowner's ability to exploit subsurface resources. 146 The property
owner may not mine or otherwise disturb the earth so as to cause
adjacent land to subside.
Not only do nearby landowners have standing to limit a land-
owner's use of land, so do local political entities. Zoning may
immune from government interference."); Parham v. Justices of Inferior Court of Decatur
County, 9 Ga. 341, 348 (Ga. 1851) ("The sacredness of private property ought not to be
confided to the uncertain virtue of those who govern." (emphasis removed)); 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 134 (1765) ("The third absolute
right, inherent in every Englishman, is that of property: which consists in the free use, en-
joyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by
the laws of the land."); FORREST McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 11 (1985) (quoting Blackstone's definition of property as
"that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.").
142. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) ("[All rights] in
fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than those on
which the particular right is founded, and which become strong enough to hold their own
when a certain point is reached.").
143. Peter S. Mennell, The Property Rights Movement's Embrace of Intellectual Property: True
Love orDoomed Relationship, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 713, 724 (2007) (quoting Benjamin Franklin,
Queries and Remarks Respecting Alterations in the Constitution of Pennsylvania (1789), in 10 THE
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 54, 59 (Albert H. Smyth ed., 1907)); see also Singer, supra
note 78.
144. See Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 376 P.2d 100, 106-07 (Or. 1962) ("[A] land-
owner has a right to be free from unreasonable interference caused by noise ...
145. See, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 373 (N.J. 1971).
146. See Raabe v. Messiah Evangelical Lutheran Church of Port Byron, 615 N.E.2d 15,
19 (I11. App. Ct. 1993) (noting that defendants' construction of parking lot, which caused
flooding on adjacent property, created a continuing nuisance); Ohio Collieries Co. v. Cocke
Nat'l Coal Co., 140 N.E. 356 (Ohio 1923) (holding that the owner of the mineral estate
cannot remove minerals in such a way as to cause damage to the surface estate).
147. Nor may landowners use their land in such a way as to cause adjacent property to
cave in, violating the duty of lateral support. Epstein notes that "the law creates a set of re-
ciprocal negative easements so that each person must leave his land in a position where it
provides lateral support for the land of a neighbor." Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, External-
ities, and the Single Owner: One More Salute to Ronald Coase, 36J. L. & ECON. 553, 575 (1993).
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impose stringent limitations on the use of land-for health and
148
safety reasons, but also for aesthetics and historical preservation.
The government, without paying compensation, may zone or regu-
late nearly all of the economic value out of a parcel of property.
Other property rules, such as the Rule Against Perpetuities, the
prohibition on racially restrictive covenants, and the doctrine of
waste, present examples of ways in which the law, common law or
otherwise, has limited the owner's rights to use his or her own
land. These rules do not restrict the owner's use of her land for its
own sake. They implement a perceived public good at the expense
of individual property rights.
These restrictions extend to the greatest attribute of property
ownership-the right to exclude."' As new conflicts develop over
the use of natural resources, or between the demands of an evolv-
ing society and private landowners, the common law has often
accommodated the intrusions. Common law courts have limited
the landowner's ability to exclude in favor of a competing use it
deemed more valuable. The law of oil and gas reserves is one ex-
ample. Common law courts were long of the view that he who owns
the soil owns from the depths up to the heavens.51 In light of this
venerable principle, the "rule of capture" facilitates a trespass. The
rule of capture provides that owners of mineral rights in land over-
laying the reservoir may drain the oil or gas from land beneath
that of another owner.152 Thus, the owner of the subsurface estate
whose oil was drawn by a neighbor could not prevent him from
153doing so.
148. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388-90 (1926) (up-
holding comprehensive zoning under local police powers); People v. Stover, 191 N.E.2d 272
(N.Y. 1963) (upholding against constitutional challenge ordinance prohibiting practice of
hanging of laundry in front yard of any street-front property).
149. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16 (1992) ("As we
have said on numerous occasions, the Fifth Amendment is violated when land-use regula-
tion 'does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner
economically viable use of his land.'" (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(1980) (emphasis omitted))).
150. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REv. 730 (1998).
151. "Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos." ("Whoever owns the soil owns
everything up to the sky and down to the depths.") BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1628 (Bryan
A. Garner ed., 7th ed. 1999).
152. Manyjurisdictions have altered this rule by statute.
153. See THOMPSON, supra note 80, § 49.02(b). According to Thompson:
The "Rule of Capture" is a negative rule of liability; the owner of an interest in the
common pool will have no liability for draining oil and gas from beneath the land of
another through a well on the interest-owner's property .... If the well is properly
located, however, the drainage is damnum absque injuria, which cannot be the subject
for an action.
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Because the owner of the soil was also historically seized of the
airspace above the land, courts have treated overflight as a species
of trespass.15 4 In keeping with the trend of the common law ac-
commodation of public needs, this right too has been
compromised. 5 In United States v. Causby, the United States Su-
preme Court recognized that allowing individuals to press trespass
claims against atmospherical intrusions would seriously interfere
with public use of air channels.5 6 Interference may be an action-
able trespass (and constitute a taking if by the government), the
rule now provides, where flight by aircraft "interferes substantially"
with the landowner's use and enjoyment of the land.157 By abrogat-
ing the landowner's right to exclude in favor of the public's right
to overfly land-a necessity of modern aviation-the courts priori-
tized competing uses.'"" As such, a balancing analysis similar to that
which courts apply in nuisance cases determines one's liability for a
trespassory overflight.
The common law also deprived a landowner of a remedy for a
trespass when use of private resources benefited the public without
harm to the landowner.' 5 Blackstone, for example, wrote that the
"common law and custom of England" held that it was no trespass
for the poor to enter another's land after harvest to glean an-
other's grounds.60 The law in England in the eighteenth century,
which the various states incorporated and displaced to varying de-
grees, denied the landowner a remedy against individuals who
trespass on their unenclosed lands.' 6' The Supreme Court, in McKee
v. Gratz, recognized that:
The strict rule of the English common law as to entry upon a
close must be taken to be mitigated by common understand-
ing with regard to the large expanses of unenclosed and
Id.
154. See Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., Inc., 170 N.E. 385, 390-91 (Mass. 1930)
(collecting cases); Ampitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 198 P.2d 847, 850-51 (Or. 1948).
155. The Restatement does question, however, whether the maxim was ever properly
regarded as law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 cmt. g (1965).
156. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S 256 (1946). The Court in Causby did recognize
that the landowner was to have "exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the envelop-
ing atmosphere," and commented that "invasions of it are in the same category as invasions
of the surface," thus preserving trespass claims for certain invasions. Id. at 264-65.
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159(b) (1965).
158. See Peter A. Winn, The Guilty Eye: Unauthorized Access, Trespass and Privacy, 62 Bus. L.
1395, 1422 (2007) ("Even in the context of a classic case of trespass to real property, the
common law establishes a complex balance.").
159. Id.
160. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 212 (1768).
161. McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 136 (1922).
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uncultivated land in many parts at least of this country. Over
these it is customary to wander, shoot and fish at will until the
owner sees fit to prohibit it. A license may be implied from
the habits of the country.162
Decisions on the state level recognized the same right. '63 Even
now, the law implies consent to hunt or fish in the absence of a
posting to the contrary, and many states require posting in order to
exclude from land. 64 Whether these statutes preserve a civil rem-
edy for landowners against those who trespass on unposted land is
unclear. The view that those posting statutes deemed to eliminate
the civil remedy in trespass for intrusions on unposted land would
not effect a taking is tenable, given that an implied easement for
hunting existed as a background principle in the common law.
65
Other limitations on the landowner's trespass remedies are well
known. 6"6 States have restricted a property owner from excluding
the employee of a farmworker aid organization from entering his
162. Id.
163. A reporter's summary of an early South Carolina case, M'Conico v. Singleton, 9
S.C.L. (2 Mill) 244 (1818), explained that "[t]he hunting of wild animals in the forests, and
unenclosed lands of this country, is as ancient as its settlement, and the right to do so coeval
therewith; and the owner of the soil, while his lands are unenclosed, cannot prohibit the
exercise of it to others." The Vermont Constitution afforded the right of individuals to hunt
and fish on the private lands of others. See Cabot v. Thomas, 514 A.2d 1034, 1037-38 (Vt.
1986). Vermont also has a posting statute, which permits the landowner a cause of action for
trespass where the hunter or fisher intrudes in disregard of a posted sign. VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 5201 (1997); see also Mark R. Sigmon, Hunting and Posting on Private Land in America, 54
DuKE L.J. 549 (2004).
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 cmt. d (1979) ("[Ihf it is the custom in
wooded or rural areas to permit the public to go hunting on private land ... ,anyone who
goes hunting... may reasonably assume, in the absence of posted notice or other manifes-
tation to the contrary, that there is the customary consent to his entry upon private land to
hunt or fish."); see also Vincent M. Roche, Road Hunting and Regulatory 7kings: An Examina-
tion of the South Dakota Supreme Court's Opinion in Benson v. State, 11 GREAT PI iNs NAT.
RESOURCES J. 1, 5 (2007) ("For most of South Dakota's history, there were practically no
limitations on the right to hunt. Indeed, up until 1973, the default rule was that hunters
could freely enter and hunt upon private property."); Sigmon, supra note 163, at 558-59.
165. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (finding that
state can regulate land so as to deprive owner of all economically beneficial use without
paying compensation when limitation inhered as a background principle of property law
imposed on title); Benson v. State, 710 N.W.2d 131 (S.D. 2006) (finding no taking in permit-
ting hunters to shoot birds flushed from a public way even when they cross into private
property); Sigmon, supra note 163, at 572-74.
166. We also note that states restrict the right of a landowner who opens an establish-
ment to the general public to unreasonably exclude individuals. See Uston v. Resorts Int'l
Hotel, Inc., 445 A.2d 370, 375 (N.J. 1982) (noting that the law "recognizes implicitly that
when property owners open their premises to the general public in the pursuit of their own
property interests, they have no right to exclude people unreasonably.").
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land to meet with migrant workers. 167 Adverse possession and the
law of easements represent two examples where the common law
sacrificed the landowner's right to do as she pleases with the land
for the public policy objective of fostering efficient use of real
property. Adverse possession transfers title from the owner of land
to one who, for the statutory period, possesses the land in a suffi-
ciently open manner, hostile to the rights of the true owner.168 The
owner can thereby no longer maintain an action for trespass. The
prescriptive easement operates in a similar manner."9 The re-
peated non-possessory use of a tract of land has the effect of
granting the user an easement for continued use. The easement by
necessity, a related type of non-possessory entitlement to the use of
property, arises over the grantor's land where the grantor deeds a
tract of land that lacks a means of egress.70
Adverse possession, in particular, provides the owner an incen-
tive to make productive use of land. The doctrine effects a transfer
from the party who values the land less to one who values it
more.7 As such, adverse possession may be seen as facilitating a
sort of "efficient trespass.' 72 We also see a privilege to trespass in
the case of private necessity, where the law prioritizes human life
and the inefficiency of destruction above the landowner's unre-
strained right to exclude. 173 In a case where a person reasonably
believes that he, his land, or his chattels would suffer serious harm,
an individual is privileged to enter or remain on land even though
it would constitute a trespass.'7 4 Again, society's interest in preserv-
167. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971) (rejecting the First Amendment as a basis
for its holding, but finding that state trespass laws do not permit prosecution of an aid
worker from entering property owner's land to confer with migrant farmworkers resident
upon it).
168. See, e.g., Hamlin v. Niedner, 955 A.2d 251 (Me. 2008) (describing elements of ad-
verse possession).
169. See, e.g., Blackstead v. Price, 190 P.3d 876 (Idaho 2008) (describing elements to ob-
tain easement by prescription).
170. The common law disapproved of conveyances of land so as to render it useless.
THOMPSON, supra note 80, § 60.03(b) (5) (i) n.317 (citing Ghen v. Piasecki, 410 A.2d 708, 712
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) ("[M]utual intent is not an essential element in the estab-
lishment of a way by necessity. Such an easement is created as a result of a strong public
policy that no land be made inaccessible or useless.")).
171. Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for "Bad Faith" Adverse Possession, 100
Nw. U. L. REv. 1037 (2006).
172. Id. at 1066 (arguing that a requirement of "bad faith" adverse possession makes
adverse possession efficient).
173. The privilege is qualified, however. The sea captain, for example, who takes refuge
in the private dock of another, and thereby trespasses, must pay damages to the extent that
he damages the dock. SeeVincentv. Lake Erie Trans. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910).
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197 (1965).
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ing the absolute right to exclude is subservient to its interest in
preventing otherwise avoidable harm to its members.
These examples bear out what Professor Powell, in his treatise
on real property, described as society's evolving give and take be-
tween the right to exclude and the public good:
As one looks back along the historic road traversed by the law
of land in England and in America, one sees a change from
the viewpoint that he who owns may do as he pleases with
what he owns, to a position which hesitatingly embodies an
ingredient of stewardship; which grudgingly, but steadily,
broadens the recognized scope of social interests in the utili-
zation of things.
1 75
Reflecting on the development of the common law over time,
Powell further stated:
The necessity for such curtailments is greater in a modern in-
dustrialized and urbanized society than it was in the relatively
simple American society of fifty, 100, or 200 years ago. The
current balance between individualism and dominance of the
social interest depends not only upon political and social ide-
ologies, but also upon the physical and social facts of the time
and place under discussion.
76
Even the sine qua non of property ownership, the right to exclude,
is hardly absolute.
Over time, courts have granted limited privileges to intrude on
private property in cases where the prospect of harm to the land-
owner is minimal, and the use socially valuable. The examples
demonstrate the ebb and flow inherent in the common law's
famed flexibility. Just as courts and state legislatures restricted
hunters' access to private property as hunting declined in impor-
tance as a source of food and commerce in the United States, new
uses-such as overflight by commercial aviation-prompted courts
to restrict exclusionary rights in new ways. Accordingly, common
law courts have repeatedly performed the interest balancing we
propose, but to different ends. As the next Section reveals, courts
have transformed trespass into a nuisance-like action where the
trespass framework has proved inadequate, and where the
175. 10 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 69.02, at 69-4 (Michael A.
Wolf ed., 2008).
176. Id. § 69.01.
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nuisance analysis was better able to balance the competing inter-
ests and prioritize the more socially valuable use of land.
b. Trespass and Nuisance in the Modern Era-Blending
the Common Law Distinctions
As a theoretical matter, trespass and nuisance provide separate
remedies for interference with separate legal rights. But as the tan-
gible intrusion approaches the intangible, the corporeal-
incorporeal distinction breaks down as a matter of theory. This
theoretical gray area between trespass and nuisance is present, a
fortiori, in practice. Economic growth fuels innovation. The result is
disputes between individuals and businesses involving real-life sce-
narios that the drafters of the Restatements could not foresee.
Courts must resolve these new conflicts. ' Courts have responded
by tinkering with the common law distinctions between trespass
and nuisance. We discuss these decisions next. They subject the
trespass cause of action to an explicit balancing of competing uses
in order to avoid subordinating, without critical evaluation, socially
useful conduct to the landowner's right to exclude. As such, these
decisions provide analogous precedents for our proposed modifi-
cation.
The Supreme Court of Oregon's decision in Martin v. Reynolds
Metals Co. is an obvious starting point.18 The case bears recounting
in some detail. In Martin, the plaintiffs brought an action against
the Reynolds Corporation alleging that its aluminum reduction
plant caused fluoride compounds, in the form of gases and par-
ticulate matter, to become airborne and settle on their land.Y9 They
argued a theory of trespass. Reynolds responded that trespass
would lie only where there had been a "breaking and entering
upon real property," constituting a direct, as opposed to a conse-
quential, invasion of land.'80 The deposit of invisible or nearly-
177. Justice Cardozo famously addressed the act of judging. Judging entails more than
the duty to "match the colors of the case at hand against the colors of many sample cases
spread out upon their desk. The sample nearest in shade supplies the applicable rule. But,
of course, no system of living law can be evolved by such a process." BENJAMIN CARDOZO,
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 20 (1921). He added: "It is when the colors do not
match, when the references in the index fail, when there is no decisive precedent, that the
serious business of the judge begins." Id. at 21.
178. 342 P.2d 790 (Or. 1959).
179. Id.; see also Frona M. Powell, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Evolution of Common Law in
Modern Pollution Cases, 21 REAL EST. L.J. 182, 197 (1992) (describing Martin).
180. Martin, 342 P.2d at 791.
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invisible particulate matter, in Reynolds's view, did not meet the
definition of a direct invasion.
The Oregon Supreme Court recounted how the common law
distinguished between the two causes of action, and observed that
other courts had handled interference by smoke or cinders as non-
trespassory.'ls But in a marked departure from the prevailing rule
that no trespass results from an invasion where "there is no 'thing'
that can be seen with the naked eye," the court reformulated its
notion of trespass to comport with modern science. 8 2 Cases adher-
ing to the old rule no longer fit within the modern concept of the
"direct" invasion. "It is quite possible," the court wrote, "that in an
earlier day when science had not yet peered into the molecular
and atomic world of small particles, the courts could not fit an in-
vasion through unseen physical instrumentalities into the
requirement that a trespass can result only from a direct invasion."183
Having rejected what it viewed as an untenable definition of
trespass, which excluded invasions of phenomena not capable of
observation by the human eye, the court set down a new standard.
A trespass can occur where the invasion takes the form of "energy
which can be measured only by the mathematical language of the
physicist."8 4 The court recognized, however, that although its new
rule corresponded with contemporary understandings of the atom,
the extension of trespass to such cases was incompatible with the
vestigial traits of the medieval cause of action for trespass. The
court acknowledged that "[t] he modern law of trespass can be un-
derstood only as it is seen against its historical background."11' The
century-old principle that trespass would lie regardless of whether
the plaintiff suffered actual harm was "colored by its past, and the
idea that the peace of the community was put in danger by the
trespasser's conduct."'8 6 As such, though normally no "inquiry is
made.., as to whether the plaintiffs interest in making a particu-
lar use of his property is within the protection provided for under
the law of trespass,' '87 the court altered this approach decisively.
Citing the overflight cases'88 it held that the "tort of trespass
181. Id. at 792-93.
182. Id. at 793 (quoting Bedell v. Goulter, 261 P.2d 842, 850 (1953) (citing WILLIAM L.
PROSSER, TORTS § 13 (2d ed. 1955); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 158 cmt. h (1934))).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 794.
185. Id. at 796.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 795.
188. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland
Meadows, 198 P.2d 847 (Or. 1948) ("Air travel over a plaintiff's land is still recognized as
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involves a weighing process, similar to that involved in the law of nui-
sance, although to a more limited extent than in nuisance, and for
a different purpose, i.e., in the one case to define the possessor's
interest in exclusive possession, and in the other to define the pos-
sessor's interest in use and enjoyment.' 89 The court's trespass
analysis would thereafter take account of the "nature of the plain-
tiffs use and the manner in which the defendant interfered with
it."' 90 Under this new rubric, the injury from the trespass must be
"substantial" in order to be actionable. 9
Thus, the Oregon Supreme Court in Martin transformed tres-
pass into a variant of nuisance. Why did it do so? One answer is
equity. The plaintiffs, whose land had been damaged severely,
would have been left without a remedy had the court not cast their
action in trespass rather than in nuisance. The statute of limita-
tions, longer for trespass than for nuisance, had already run on the
nuisance action.' 92 The more plausible explanation, however, is that
the common law distinctions between trespass and nuisance, inher-
ited from feudal times, made little sense in the context of
industrial pollution in the twentieth century. Neither did granting
the landowner an automatic judgment in a trespass action irrespec-
tive of the value of the use that produced the trespass. Balancing
competing uses was appropriate and wise. The decision sacrificed
clarity in favor of an approach that, at least in the court's view,
permitted a fact-specific, utility-driven adjudication between com-
peting uses of land.' 93
In Borland v. Sanders Lead Co.,'" the Alabama Supreme Court
reached a similar result, modifying the traditional understanding
of trespass and nuisance. '9 Borland found the deposit of lead and
sulfoxide particulates from the smokestack of a nearby lead smelter
to constitute a trespass.' 96 The court distinguished trespass from
nuisance based on whether the invasion caused "substantial dam-
age" to the land.' 97 By considering the nature and extent of the
trespass prima facie imposing liability but the rights of airplane travel are established or
recognized by the doctrine of privilege.").
189. Martin, 342 P.2d at 795 (citing Hinman v. Pacific Air Transp. Corp., 84 E2d 755
(9th Cir. 1936)) (emphasis added).
190. Id.
191. Id. ("But there is a point where the entry is so lacking in substance that the law will
refuse to recognize it, applying the maxim de minimis non curat lex." (emphasis added)).
192. Id. at 791-92.
193. See RICHARD R. POWELL & PATIUCK J. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY: ONE-
VOLUME EDITION 201 (1968).
194. 369 So.2d 523 (Ala. 1979).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 529.
197. Id. at 530.
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plaintiff's use of land and the damage it suffered, the Borland rule
effects an implicit balancing inconsistent with the traditional tres-
pass remedy. Other courts have since followed this approach,98
though some refuse to do so.199
The line of decisions that Martin and Borland exemplify might
logically be confined to cases of air pollution. The threats to health
and livelihood air pollution presents might justify providing in-
jured homeowners with a stronger remedy. But the distinction
between trespass and nuisance is untenable at the margins. Even
the Second Restatement, in explaining the distinction between
trespass and nuisance, manages to confound them.00 Judges
should not feel constrained by trespass's outmoded straitjacket of
strict liability for tangible invasions of land.
Because nuisance permits the court to tailor a remedy to maxi-
mize total utility, we do not think courts should confine their
198. The Washington Supreme Court expressly adopted this analysis in Bradley v. Ameri-
can Smelting and Refining Co., 709 P.2d 782 (Wash. 1985). The court in Bradley reinforced the
view that invisible particular matter could constitute a trespass, but only where it caused
'actual and substantial damages." Id. at 791. In Renken v. Harvey Aluminum (Inc.), 226 F.
Supp. 169 (D. Or. 1963), plaintiffs again sued an aluminum plant to enjoin operations be-
cause it was allegedly depositing particulate matter on their lands. Relying on Martin and
finding that plaintiffs had proven a trespass, the court placed the burden on the defendant
"to show that the use of its property, which caused the injury, was unavoidable or that it
could not be prevented except by the expenditure of such vast sums of money as would
substantially deprive it of the use of its property." Id. at 174. The court then ordered the
defendant to install pollution control devices under threat of injunction. Id. at 176. This
remedy borrows explicitly from the remedies courts have imposed after finding an action-
able nuisance. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
199. SeeAdams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 602 N.W.2d. 215 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). In a
claim alleging trespass by an iron mine as a result of the noise, vibrations and particulate
matter it produced, the Michigan Court of Appeals stated:
We do not welcome this redirection of trespass law toward nuisance law. The re-
quirement that real and substantial damages be proved, and balanced against the
usefulness of the offending activity, is appropriate where the issue is interference with
one's use or enjoyment of one's land; applying it where a landowner has had to en-
dure an unauthorized physical occupation of the landowner's land, however, offends
traditional principles of ownership.
Id. at 221.
200. In two of its illustrations intended to illustrate the difference between trespass and
nuisance, it analyzes what is effectively the same intentional, tangible invasion of land under
different rubrics. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 cmt. h, illus. 5 (1965)
(where A knowingly erects a dam causing water to spill over onto B's land, he causes a tres-
pass), with § 833 cmt. a, illus. I (potential liability in nuisance results where A builds an
embankment on his land causing water to flood B's land). See Page Keeton, Trespass, Nui-
sance, and Strict Liability, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 466 (1959) (noting that these two illustrations
are "apparently in conflict. Either the actor who erects the dam should be liable as a tres-
passer for the water damage in both instances without respect to the reasonableness of the
interference, or he should not be liable unless the water caused substantial damage and
constituted... an unreasonable interference" with the flooded land).
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reappraisal of trespass and nuisance to the case of environmental
pollution. °' Instead, judges should expand the trend to include
trespassory art. Another decision of the Supreme Court of Oregon
supports such an expansion. In Lloyd Corp. Ltd. v. Whiffen, the court
addressed the rights of individuals to solicit signatures for a peti-
tion on the grounds of a private mall without the permission of the202
owner. The case raised questions akin to those the United States
Supreme Court addressed in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins -
that is, whether the United States and State Constitutions permit
individuals to exercise free speech rights in private malls despite
the owner's practice of excluding such groups.0" The Lloyd court
specifically rejected such an approach in the case before it, just as
we reject the PruneYard analysis as a basis for increasing access to
private and public property for trespassory artists.0 5 Instead, the
court decided the case on sub-constitutional grounds.0 6 Plaintiff
requested an injunction to prevent continuing and future tres-207 - .
passes uFinding that access to the mall would hinder the public
interest in the exchange of ideas, the court balanced that interest
against the interference the petitioners caused to business opera-
tions. The court concluded:
[P] laintiff is not entitled to an injunction to prohibit peaceful
solicitation of signatures in the mall or on its walkways that
does not substantially interfere with the commercial activity
on the premises.... The public policy behind the signature-
201. See Atkinson v. Bernard, Inc., 355 P.2d 229, 233 (Or. 1960) (noting that "[t]he
flexibility of nuisance law enables the trial judge to take into consideration ... all relevant
factors which will assist him in balancing the interests of the parties before the court in light
of the relevant public interest."). We have contemplated objections from adherents to the
law and economics school that our proposed rule, in fact, reduces efficiency because it fore-
closes efficient bargaining by the parties. This objection is powerful. As we discuss in the
next Section, however, we do not believe that it applies with its usual force in the case of
trespassory art.
202. Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, 773 P.2d 1294 (Or. 1989).
203. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
204. Lloyd, 773 P.2d at 1297. The court concluded that although the petitioners did not
have a right under the U.S. or Oregon constitutions to trespass on private property, neither
did refusing plaintiffs request for an injunction to prevent further trespass constitute a tak-
ing. Id. at 1302 ("A proper order [enjoining prosecution for trespass] will not create an
easement for signature-gatherers or anyone else, nor otherwise take plaintiffs property for
public use without due process orjust compensation contrary to Article I, section 18, of the
Oregon Constitution or to the Fourteenth Amendment." (citing PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 74)).
205. See infra Part IV.
206. Lloyd, 773 P.2d at 1297 ("In this case, we conclude on a subconstitutional level that
plaintiff is not entitled to the broad injunction it sought and received.").
207. Id. at 1298-1301.
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gathering process limits equitable enforcement of plaintiff's
preferred total exclusion of signature solicitors.208
In Lloyd, the plaintiffs right to a remedy for an unquestioned
trespass turned on nuisance principles.2 0 9 The court balanced the
importance of the speech to the public against the inconvenience
and injury to the landowner. Martin and Lloyd represent two more
examples of the "public conversation" that has taken place from
the beginning of American legal history "about the balance be-
tween individual rights and public rights with respect to the
meaning of property., 210 The concept of property has "evolved as
community consensus about the individual-public balance has
evolved."
2
We argue that trespassory art has a place in this evolution. Lloyd
and Martin present a blueprint for our analysis. The approach the
court took in those cases provides room to protect property rights
and afford trespassory art a platform for expression. Just as the
Lloyd court considered the public importance of the solicitors'
speech, so too should courts acknowledge the expressive character
of trespassory art. Indeed, trespassory art presents an even more
compelling basis for expanding the Oregon courts' nuisance-
infused trespass analysis. Unlike most generic speech, the
site-specific filter we suggest that courts impose to identify qualify-
ing trespassory art furnishes a principled basis for excluding the
majority of intruders. We avoid a principal criticism of Lloyd-that
it provides no limiting criteria in order to avoid widespread dilu-
tion of property rights. Our proposal does not therefore threaten
the institution of private property.
208. Id. at 1301.
209. Though it concedes that trespass law involves balancing in a "very narrow sense,"
the dissent accused the majority opinion of "blend[ing] continuing trespass law and nui-
sance law by citing two inapposite nuisance cases as support for this overbroad statement
about continuing trespass law." Id. at 1306-07 (Carson, J., dissenting). The majority re-
sponded to the dissent's "fevered nightmare that the skies of trespass law are falling" by
pointing out that the opinion concerned "not the law of trespass," but "the discretionary use
of equitable injunctions" to conduct that ajury might find to be trespassory. Id. at 1302.
210. Myrl L. Duncan, Property as a Public Conversation, Not a Lockean Solution: A Role for In-
tellectual and Legal History in Takings Analysis, 26 ENVTL. L. 1095, 1159 (1996).
211. Id.; seeSinger, supra note 78.
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4. Privilege for Trespassory Art-The Boundaries of a "Fair Use"
Defense for Artistic Trespass to Real Property
The approach this Article describes above, we believe, demon-
strates the feasibility of analyzing art-directed invasions, which
would remain trespasses (and thus subject to damages with proof
of harm and possible injunctive relief), under the analytic and re-
medial rubric of nuisance principles. The related field of
intellectual property also informs our analysis. Judges, practitio-
ners, and commentators are now battling to shape the scope of
protection for intellectual property rights.212 Our discussion ana-
lyzes what lessons intellectual property holds for its examination of
trespassory art. It focuses in particular on the fair use defense to
copyright infringement. We conceive of fair use as a useful analogy
for the proposed privilege for trespassory art under the law of tort.
The fair use doctrine in copyright law is a natural potential ana-
logue to our modified property law regime, but the analogy must
be accompanied by a disclaimer. Real property and intellectual
property are different. Real property is finite and rivalrous; intel-
lectual property is not. 13 Yet we see a similarity between fair use
and the nuisance-based trespassory art analysis. The fair use doc-
trine permits uses of copyrighted materials that would otherwise
constitute infringement to be "deemed noninfringing because they
advance the ... constitutional purpose[s] of copyright law., 21
4
These purposes include the "broad public availability of literature,
music, and the other arts."215 Although Section 107 of the Copy-
right Act 1 6 incorporates a fair use provision pursuant to a 1976
amendment, courts have long implied such a defense. 2 '7 The pur-
pose of the fair use doctrine is to "avoid rigid application of the
212. The internet is a particularly fertile ground for this debate. The internet raises
questions about whether the law should subject trespasses on online "property" to the same
right to exclude as real property, or whether the internet should approximate a commons.
Whether the intellectual property be virtual or corporeal, the law has implied safety valves
into the property holder's ability to monopolize the market. Patents are of limited duration.
Copyright enforcement is unavailable where the infringer successfully proves a fair use de-
fense. See Peter S. Mennell, Intellectual Property and the Property Rights Movement, REGULATION,
Fall 2007, at 37-38 (noting that property rights movement proponents "would shoehorn
intellectual property into an idealized Blackstonian conception of property rights as exclu-
sive and inviolate.").
213. Id. at 38 ("Unlike tangible goods, knowledge and creative works are public goods
in the sense that their use is nonrivalrous. One agent's use does not limit another agent's
use. Indeed, in its natural state, knowledge is also 'nonexcludable.' ").
214. BRUCE P. KELLER &JEFFREY P. CUNARD, COPYRIGHT LAW § 8:3, at 8-5 (2007).
215. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151,156 (1975).
216. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
217. KELLER & CUNARD, supra note 214, at 8-6 & n.16 (citing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas.
342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)).
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copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativ-
ity which that law is designed to foster."2 1 8 The statutory factors that
guide courts' fair use analysis consider the purpose and character
of the use-with non-commercial uses being favored-the amount
of copying, and the market for the copyrighted work. These factors
favor a creative, transformative work undertaken for non-
commercial purposes that borrows little from the underlying mate-
rial. The inquiry effectively balances the value of the defendant's
creation against the injury to the plaintiffs interest in the
copyright in light of the object and purpose of copyright law.
We view our proposed modification to real property and tort law
in similar terms. The fair use inquiry, at its heart, focuses on
whether the infringer has transformed the copyrighted material
and has thereby added new value; the law does not privilege mere
copying.219 The courts will also consider whether the transformed
work will affect the market for the original.2 'A fair use defense is
less likely to succeed when the infringer denies the holder of the
221
copyright a market for his or her work. Commentators have ar-
gued that the current fair use analysis makes insufficient provision
for new forms of art-those, for example, that "rely on pastiche, or
the imitating of existing styles, in part to express the postmodern
notion that it is no longer possible to create new styles. 2 22 Appro-
priation art, a significant modern form of art which uses the work
of others in its representations, may therefore go unprotected.223
The Supreme Court's opinion in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose protected
appropriation for comedic use, parody in that case, but excluded
from the protection of fair use satire and other types of art that
criticize without parodying. 4 As Sonia Katyal points out, works that
"contribute to, but do not transform, the original copyrighted
218. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (quoting Iowa State Univ. Research
Found., Inc. v. American Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980)).
219. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
220. See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 258 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting, in applicable statu-
tory fair use factors under 17 U.S.C. § 107(4), that the court's "concern is not whether the
secondary use suppresses or even destroys the market for the original work or its potential
derivatives, but whether the secondary use usurps the market of the original work." (quoting
NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471,481-82 (2d Cir. 2004))).
221. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 (describing fourth fair use factor, which considers the
impact on the market for the copyrighted work).
222. Nicholas B. Lewis, Comment, Shades of Grey: Can the Copyright Fair Use Defense Adapt
to New Re-Contextualized Forms of Music and Art?, 55 Am. U. L. REV. 267, 281 (2005) (citing
Robert M. Szymanski, Audio Pastiche: Digital Sampling Intermediate Copying Fair Use, 3 UCLA
ENT. L. REV. 271, 280 n.37 (1996)).
223. Katyal, supra note 2, at 541-43.
224. 510 U.S. 569, 580-81 (1994); see also Roxana Badin, Comment, An Appropriate(d)
Place in Transformative Value: Appropriation Art's Exclusion from Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, Inc., 60
BROOK. L. REv. 1653, 1653-54 (1995).
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work" do not receive fair use protection. The push towards ex-
panding the fair use defense to acknowledge and foster new,
innovative art forms parallels the argument for a privilege for tres-
passory art on real property.
Katyal argues that intellectual property law should channel
much of the transformative appropriative art, which currently ex-
ists outside the sanction of the law, within it.226 This Article attempts
a related argument under the common law of real property and
tort. Like digital sampling of music, which appropriates, reinter-
prets, and recodes copyrighted material, the trespassory artist
effectively performs the same function with real property. Each of
the examples of trespassory art-whether it be laser graffiti or
parkour--demonstrates this function. The laser-graffiti or bill-
board-liberation artist does to the skyscraper or commercial
billboard what Marcel DuChamp did to the urinal at the turn of
the century.
A prong of the fair use test measures the economic harm from
the infringement to the copyright holder. The approach this Arti-
cle proposes would have courts measure the injury to the
landowner. Where the landowner suffers injury, damages are war-
ranted and, where the prospect of continued intrusion is present,
injunctive relief may be appropriate. But what is "harm?" Copyright
law answers this question with relative ease: the court hears evi-
dence on the effect of the infringing material on the market for
the original.22' The question is more difficult in the case of real
property. The injury to a professor's lawn when a college student
cuts across it on his way to class is more elusive. The common law's
answer was simple: the student invaded the professor's right to ex-
clusive possession, and was at least liable for nominal damages. We
answer that the artist who produces qualifying trespassory art
should enjoy a limited privilege from these damages. The collage
artist may appropriate copyrighted material under fair use, 28 and
enjoys a limited right to trespass on an individual's right to public-
ity where the appropriation is transformative. 29 Similarly, the value
of qualifying trespassory art may override, in limited cases, the so-
cial benefit society derives from allowing landowners to vindicate
the interest in mere exclusion.
225. Katyal, supra note 2, at 547.
226. Id. at 496-98.
227. See Blanch v. Koons, 467 E3d 244, 258 (2d Cir. 2006).
228. Id.
229. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 938 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that
artist's use of a likeness of Tiger Woods did not violate, among other things, his right to
publicity, because the art was transformative and valuable under the First Amendment).
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As to the landowner's entitlement to nominal damages, we re-
place a property rule with a rule of non-liability. Courts should not
award damages in the face of a qualifying artistic trespassory inva-
sion. Richard Epstein, among others, has questioned why a
landowner would ever sue for nominal damages alone. 30 If this is
true, then of what value is this entitlement? Because punitive dam-
ages, premised on nominal damages alone, are available in many
jurisdictions, the modification would preclude courts from penaliz-
ing artists who do no actual harm to the land or landowner.3
Of course, the trespassory artist should not be privileged to
impose injury on the land that would be compensable under other
tort principles. Artistic installations that cause actual damage-
such as where the artist digs a ditch to house or secure her
art-justify an award of damages for injury and an injunction or-
dering its removal or repair. As Part IV recognizes, however, injury
need not take the form of physical damage to the land: requiring
the landowner to bear the artist's message can be harmful.2 2 The
court's award of damages to the landowner for injury arising from
attribution functions as a liability rule-the judgment approxi-
mates the bargain the artist and landowner would have struck had
such an exchange taken place. 3 Nor, except in the rarest instances
of overriding social value, should a landowner who disapproves of
art on his land, for whatever reason, be denied the right to compel
its removal. Although he will not win nominal damages, the modi-
fication we propose should not be interpreted to permit the artist
to impose a permanent easement on the property of another.
5. One Objection-The Law and Economics Perspective
We have argued that the right to exclude can, and in narrow
cases should, bend to accommodate so-called "trespassory art." The
proposal is potentially objectionable on a variety of grounds. One
might criticize the constitutional legitimacy of our proposal. We
230. Richard Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. CH. L. REv. 73, 78 (2003).
231. SeeJaque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc. 563 N.W.2d 154, 166 (Wis. 1997) (permitting
punitive damages on the basis of nominal damages, absent evidence of any injury warranting
compensatory damages).
232. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977); Randall Bezanson, Speaking
Through Others' Voices: Authorship, Originality, and Free Speech, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 983,
1018-23 (2003).
233. Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106
YALE L.J. 2091 (1997) (describing a liability rule as one in which the "owner of the thing
receives some right to compensation for the thing that has been taken away from him
against his will"). For a discussion of the distinction between property and liability rules, see
infra Part III.A.5.
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answer that objection in Part IV. Advocates of strong property
rights, and commentators from the law and economics school, will
naturally contend that the modification muddles the formerly clear
system of property entitlements on which efficient bargaining is
based. This Section identifies those objections and explores why we
believe they do not threaten our proposal.
American law has generally followed Blackstone's conception of
property as an absolute right, subject to limited intrusion by gov-
ernment.234 Legal rules protective of property rights spurred
development of the western United States as this country grew in
the nineteenth century. Like Blackstone, many legal theorists today
support a system of strong property entitlements, particularly those
theorists associated with law and economics. Strong property rules
are necessary to permit us to "barter and trade for what we want
instead of fighting."3 5 Unambiguous property entitlements, in
other words, are efficient.36 Clear rules eliminate uncertainty and
permit parties to bargain to reach an efficient allocation of re-
sources. This, in turn, avoids the tragedy of commons that afflicts
societies with shared resources or weak protections for private
property.
237
Clear rules and robust protection for property owners are par-
ticularly appropriate, it is argued, when it comes to the right to
exclude.2 8 The right to exclude should be as absolute as possible.
And, as trespass claims will frequently involve two landowners, and
will take the form of the one-time invasion of the land by a
neighbor who lays a fence over the property line or the lazy pedes-
trian who insists on taking a shortcut over private land, 239 the
benefits of a straightforward rule-one that affords the landowner
234. In this the meaning of property was influenced by John Locke. Just as Locke's
writings on civil government influenced the Founders at the time of the framing of the Con-
stitution, his views of property as an a priori private right worthy of robust protection were
similarly influential. See Duncan, supra note 210, at 1096 ("The Lockean system was domi-
nant at the time when the Constitution was adopted." (citing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 16 (1985))); MyrI L. Duncan,
Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks: Land as a Community-Based Resource, 32 ENVTL. L. 773, 786
(2002) ("The bundle metaphor's bias in favor of absolutist property rights perpetuates the
classic liberal definition of property historically associated with John Locke.").
235. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577,578 (1988).
236. Cf Richard Epstein, Intellectual Property: Old Boundaries and New Frontiers, 76 IND.
L.J. 803, 819 (2001) ("In general, I think that private voluntary arrangements will outper-
form forced interactions in the long run.").
237. See Michael Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property through a Property Paradigm, 54
DuKE L.J. 1, 27-28 (2004).
238. See Epstein, supra note 230, at 74 (celebrating the right to exclude and noting that
"[e]fficient contracting can take place only if A, as owner, is entitled to decide who enters
his property and who keeps off.").
239. See Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997), for one example.
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automatic damages and the possibility of an injunction absent
proof of harm, and that spurns consideration of the defendant's
proposed use for the land-are clear. Such a rule reduces transac-
tion costs. The would-be trespasser knows he will be liable, just as
the landowner knows that the court will take his side. Neither party
need wait for the court to perform a nuisance-like balancing analy-
sis to determine his or her legal rights. The common law remedies
for trespass constitute what Calabresi and Melamed, in their fa-
mous article, would call a "property rule."2 40 An entitlement is
protected by a property rule in cases where "someone who wishes
to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in
a voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitlement is
agreed upon by the seller.2 41 When transaction costs are low, the
parties are in a position to bargain their way to an efficient out-
242
come.
Indeed, trespass is the prototypical property rule.43 The home-
owner who wishes to build over his property line will have an
incentive to bargain for the right to do so, knowing that he will
otherwise be forced by court injunction to remove the structure. In
that case, the market, rather than the government, establishes the
value of the entitlement-that is, the amount that the landowner
whose right to exclusive possession of his land is violated will ac-
cept to permit the encroachment. This result is in line with the
insights of Ronald Coase, who theorized that "voluntary
rearrangements of property rights will maximize the aggregate wel-
fare of all market participants."
2 44
Where transaction costs are high, the "property rule" gives way
to the "liability rule." A liability rule "means that the other party
may destroy the entitlement if he is willing to compensate the
entitlement-holder for it at some value set by the state or the
240. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inaliena-
bility: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
241. Id. at 1092.
242. Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14
J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 21 (1985).
243. See Keith N. Hylton, Duty in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 75 FORDHAM L. REv.
1501, 1510 (2007) ("Trespass law is a property rule in the sense that it permits the land-
owner to enjoin the trespasser and to seek damages. The power to enjoin forces the
would-be trespasser to bargain for access to the landowner's property. The injunction power
protects the subjective valuation of the landowner, because if the trespasser could invade the
landowner's property and be required to do no more than pay compensatory damages, the
subjective portion of the landowner's valuation would not be protected by the law."); Stewart
E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property Rights, 106 MIcH. L. REv.
1285, 1296 (2008) (describing trespass as a property rule insofar as it "puts my neighbor on
notice that she must deal with me if she wants to use 'my' land.").
244. Merrill, supra note 242, at 21.
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courts."2 14 5 Where a violation or disturbance-such as air pollution
from an aluminum reduction plant-affects a wide swath of land-
owners, transaction costs increase and the type of bargaining
possible in the two-player scenario becomes nearly impossible. Not
surprisingly, nuisance is the prototypical example of a liability
rule.246 The court imposes damages on the producer of the
nuisance, compensating the affected landowners and forcing the
producer to internalize the cost of the interference with the land-
owners' use and enjoyment of their land.2 47 Thomas Merrill, for
example, suggests that the law favors "mechanical" rules, i.e., "rules
that determine entitlements at a low cost-such as the strict liabil-
ity rule of trespass" when costs of transacting are low, and the
cost-benefit balancing type approach when they are high (e.g.,
nuisance) .24
These market-based considerations do not, seemingly, bode well
for our proposed modification. They counsel that, because transac-
tion costs are apt to be low in the trespass scenario, the mechanical
property entitlement of trespass maximizes social welfare better
than the balancing approach of nuisance.249 The examples of
trespassory art we have laid out above generally contemplate the
two-player collision of interests: the artist wishing to invade and
appropriate private property to express his or her own message,
and the landowner wishing to prevent the same. One response
would be to force the artist-like the neighbor who wants to (or
mistakenly does) build his deck over the property line-to bargain
for the privilege. 250 The large body of economics-influenced legal
thought arguably supports such an outcome.
We argue, however, that the efficiency calculus that suggests a
mechanical rule in the case of the encroaching neighbor, or the
pedestrian who wishes to take a shortcut home, does not dictate a
similar outcome in our examples. We can think of two reasons for
245. Michael I. Swigert & Katherine Earl Yanes, A Primer on the Coase Theorem: Making
Law in a World of Zero Transaction Costs, 11 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 1, 25 (1998) (citing Calabresi &
Melamed, supra note 240, at 1092).
246. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Common Law Property Metaphors on the Internet: The Real
Problem with the Doctrine of Cybertrespass, 12 MICH. "ILECOMM. & TECH. L. Rv. 265, 330 (2006)
(noting that "the law of nuisance is aptly representative of a liability rule (in allowing for a
court enforced sale of the right).").
247. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 873-74 (N.Y. 1970).
248. Merrill, supra note 242, at 13-14.
249. The argument goes, in other words, voluntary (contract-based) arrangements
maximize general utility far better than does a court when it assigns rights and duties.
250. See, e.g., Hirschfield v. Schwartz, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 861, 866-67 (Ct. App. 2001)
(noting that when one neighbor encroaches on another's land, the court balances the equi-
ties to determine "whether to grant an injunction prohibiting the trespass, or whether to
award damages instead.").
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this result. First, assuming that trespassory art produces two-party
interactions,5 ' transaction costs can be high even in these situa-
tions.252 The type of bargaining normally possible in the case of the
trespasser is frequently unrealistic for the trespassory artist. The
trespassory artist is, effectively, an invader who aims to proceed in
secrecy and in stealth to accomplish his artistic end without detec-
tion. The goal is to avoid bargaining. While acknowledging
exceptions, Judge Richard Posner recognizes that the cost of
transacting in these cases is "normally prohibitive., 25 3 Addressing
the economic implications of laws regarding the permissibility of
spring guns to ward off burglars and other trespassers, Posner
suggests that " [i] t is not feasible for the landowner to contract with
the potential trespasser or the potential trespasser with the
landowner.25 4 One immediately thinks also of private necessity as a
defense to trespass. Precisely in cases where bargaining is impossi-
ble or, given the presence of an emergency of sufficient severity to
invoke the excuse in the first place, unrealistic, the law provides a
255rule of non-liability from trespass.
Posner's insight certainly applies in the cases of groups such as
the Billboard Liberation Front. They fear detection and operate in
secrecy, generally at night. The same generally applies to
shopdroppers and droplifters. It is less clear whether the
traceurs-practitioners of parkour and free running-are similarly
constrained. Their art will generally bring them into contact with
landowners and create the opportunity to bargain. Sebastian
Foucan's experience in Jump London certainly suggests that free
running can operate on this basis. Those who wish to perform par-
kour can, as Foucan did, negotiate with landowners and obtain
251. Of course, we can imagine that trespassory art affects more than one landowner at
a time. The urban practitioner of parkour, for example, no doubt crosses the property lines
of scores of owners in one session. Attempting to bargain with fifteen landowners for the
right to use their property, as compared with just one, increases transactions costs. Under
Merrill's analysis, this suggests a liability rule rather than a property rule.
252. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 50 (7th ed. 2007). Posner
suggests that in two party transactions, there may be no choice but to bargain with the other
party, driving up the costs of bargaining. Accordingly, even if the artist was to bargain with
the landowner, whose property the artist wishes to use for a site-specific installation, the
transaction costs might be prohibitively high. This realization pushes us towards a liability
rule and away from a property rule.
253. Richard Posner, Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property Interest, 14J. L. & EcoN. 201,
224 (1971).
254. Id.
255. Epstein explains why, from an economics perspective, private necessity excuses a
trespass, noting that "the rigorous right to exclude costs everybody a lot more than it is
worth." Epstein, supra note 236, at 816.
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permission to perform. Tunick too usually secures permission be-
fore proceeding with an installation.' 6
The parkour example, however, raises a second, related argu-
ment as to why the market efficiency teachings of the law and
economics school should not preclude courts from analyzing
trespassory art under nuisance principles. The trespassory art form
rejects such bargaining as accommodationism. That rejection is
itself expressive.257 That Foucan performed on the various London
landmarks with the permission of the city undeniably changed the
nature and quality of the expression. This fact, perhaps, meshes
with what enthusiasts understand to be free running's emphasis on
acrobatics, to the exclusion of parkour's rigorous focus on the
physical expression of an absence of boundaries, and its transcen-
dence of the same.
Our point is better illustrated by the Billboard Liberation Front,
the droplifters/shopdroppers, and ImprovEverywhere. Their art
exists in order to perpetrate the trespass, to reverse existing
limitations, to effect a culture jam. The shopdropper's purpose is to
surprise, to recode expectations and beliefs. Bargaining with the
store owner or corporation to redecorate a can of peas, and then
to surreptitiously place it in the store, is entirely inconsistent with
the art.2 58 It would defeat the purpose. Similarly, the aesthetic
message of ImprovEverywhere's mission in Grand Central Station
would change had it sought and obtained the New York Transit
Authority's permission to perform. Although the two parties might
have successfully kept the mission under wraps and managed to
stun the audience of passersby, what made the mission special was
how it surprised everyone-including station employees.259 Sonia
Katyal, who explores the practitioners of "semiotic disobedience,"
comments on these modern-day monkeywrenchers:
256. Though, given the logistical difficulties and requirements that accompany arrang-
ing to photograph thousands of nudes on a city street, it is difficult to imagine how he could
proceed otherwise.
257. See Eduardo Moiss Pefialver & Sonia Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. Rev.
1095, 1183 (2007) (describing the expressive characteristics of various acts of civil disobedi-
ence, and noting that "when someone violates the very law to which she is opposed, she
conveys both her intensity and seriousness, and, in addition, provides a visible example of
the alternative state of affairs she hopes to bring about.").
258. For example, Katyal suggests that "part of the richness of semiotic disobedience
inheres in its transgression of the operative boundaries that govern both property and intel-
lectual property. In other words, its illegal character can also be part and parcel of its
message." Katyal, supra note 2, at 552. Moreover, in the case of shopdropping, the store
owner would be prohibited by federal law from agreeing to cover required labels on mer-
chandise.
259. One naturally thinks of the maintenance worker in the cart who appeared incredu-
lous, confused and perhaps amused at the scene unfolding before him.
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[They] create an alternative system of meaning that both ap-
propriates and interrupts the protected associations within
the marketplace of ideas.... [They] create[] a new, converg-
ing marketplace of speech that is largely designed to interrupt
and interfere with the "codes" of the previous one. The result
is a world in which the powerful purchase properties-
billboards, domain names, and the like--only to have their
messages exposed, occupied, and thus interrupted by their
260disenfranchised counterparts.
Economic analysis holds powerful lessons for how legal rules can
and should channel behavior. We submit that the rigid, mechanical
orthodox rules of entitlement-what Calabresi and Melamed
would term a property rule-cannot perform their typical role as
applied to most trespassory art. Developing a legal rule to imple-
ment Coasian precepts will prove ineffectual where, as here, the
point of the art is to upend, jam, and reinterpret social structures
and to accomplish through mislabeling or other behavior what the
law may prohibit the owner from agreeing to do.26'
6. Trespassory Art in the Courts
The modification of trespass that we propose necessarily involves
judging the quality of art. Although Justice Holmes long ago coun-
seled his judicial colleagues against that very task, judges are
frequently asked to evaluate the aesthetic or artistic merits of art-
work.262 For example, the Visual Artists Rights Act ("VARA") invites
courts to determine whether a work of art is of "recognized
stature," while the fair use doctrine asks judges to evaluate the aes-
thetic and transformative value of a parody. Courts have also
waded into the debate over site specificity.265 At the same time, ju-
ries resolve artistic and aesthetic issues the law deems "questions of
260. Katyal, supra note 2, at 514.
261. Id. at 511-12. For example, with Parkour, tort liability or injury; with billboard lib-
eration, libel, invasion of privacy; with Tunic or graffiti, public nudity or obscenity
prosecution could fall upon an agreeing landowner.
262. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903).
263. See Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805 (2005) (discussing the
various ways in which judges evaluate art).
264. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006). See supra text accompanying notes 219-220 for a discus-
sion of transformation as an element of fair use analysis.
265. See Serra v. U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., 847 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1988) (involving Rich-
ard Serra's Tilted Arc, in Federal Plaza in New York City); Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate,
Inc., 288 F. Supp. 2d 89 (D. Mass. 2003) (addressing site specificity in the context of a claim
that removal of a sculpture from a park would constitute alteration of the work).
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fact." In obscenity prosecutions, for example, courts ask juries to
evaluate alleged obscene speech by reference to prevailing com-
munity standards. 6
Where an angry landowner brings suit to win damages from a
trespassory artist, the jury will be in the room anyway to determine
the predicate question-has there been a trespass?26 7 Accordingly,
the authors are comfortable affording the jury a role in determin-
ing whether trespassory art qualifies as such under our standards.
Jurors are uniformly savvy enough to determine, in light of com-
mon sense and experience, whether the art in question: (i) is
trespassory, (ii) is expressive, and (iii) asserts a connection with the
site. The jury must also decide whether the landowner has suffered
harm. If the art qualifies, and the plaintiff cannot show harm war-
ranting an award of compensatory damages or his entitlement to
268
an injunction, the judge should dismiss the case.
For an illustration of the jury's reliability, we need only look to
the prosecution of J.S. Boggs, the controversial "currency artist" in
the United Kingdom. Boggs recreates what at first glance appear to
be bills of currency, but which on closer examination turn out to
be something different entirely. He has faced prosecution in the
United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States. At his trial for
counterfeiting in the United Kingdom, the jury heard from art
critics who explained the creativity and value of Boggs's work and,
of course, from the government, which made its case for why
Boggs's tromp-l'oeil reproductions of currency constituted criminal
counterfeiting. Although the judge all but ordered the jury to con-
vict Boggs, whose acts easily qualified as counterfeiting under
British law, the jury acquitted Boggs of all charges after ten min-
utes of deliberation. 69 Sometimes art may be safer in the hands of
juries than in those ofjudges.70
Whether the trespassory art criteria we identify ultimately come
before judge or jury, this Article proposes that judges act first to
modify the common law. The landowner's entitlement to nominal
damages for a violation of his or her right of exclusive possession is
not an empty remedy. But, as Benjamin Franklin's maxim suggests,
it is one that can and should give way when the necessities of soci-
266. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). Although the question is less artistic,
juries resolve consumer confusion questions in trademark lawsuits.
267. Meixsell v. Feezor, 43 Ill. App. 180, 182 (App. Ct. 1891) ("The questions of posses-
sion and the commission of a trespass were for the jury. ").
268. To reiterate, we contend that in the context of "trespassory art," injury to the plain-
tiffs right to exclusive use and possession of the land does not warrant an award of nominal
damages or, except in special cases, injunctive relief.
269. BEZANSON, supra note 61, at 267.
270. Id.
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ety require it7'1 Trespassory art is a species of a wider brand of ap-
propriation art-art that hijacks, recodes, and reinterprets cultural
signals and infuses them with new meaning. In its current configu-
ration, the law of real property and tort stifles this form of
expression unduly. This Article addresses a narrow subset of ap-
propriation art, art that asserts a connection with land and uses it
as an expressive vehicle. Whether it be a piece of groundbreaking
land art, the expressive, athletic pursuit of parkour, or the culture
jamming that makes up ImprovEverywhere, this type of art offers
expressive value to society. It strains under the rules of real prop-
erty and the tort remedy of trespass. Because trespassory art asserts
a connection with the land, its claim to legal recognition is particu-
larly strong. And this Article has proposed elimination of but one
remedy-damages without proof of harm-whose connection to
trespass's medieval past is stronger than to the demands of land
use in the twenty-first century. The narrowness of the category is
one of its primary virtues. So is the range of expression it offers,
which this Article argues will expand once trespassory art is
brought into the legal fold.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE TRESPASS QUESTION
It is important to emphasize again that we do not propose that
private property be considered public property when occupied by
art. Arguments that private property should be deemed public
property for constitutional purposes have met with modest success
in a very small number of states,272 they have been grounded in
state rather than federal free speech concepts, 73 their application
has been highly selective and limited only to large and open pri-
vate property, like shopping malls and private universities,274 and, in
271. See supra note 153.
272. E.g., In re Lane, 457 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1969) (finding a constitutionally protected right
to distribute pamphlets, etc., on privately-owned streets); NJ. Coal. Against War in the Mid-
dle East v. J.M.B. Realty Co., 650 A.2d 757 (NJ. 1994) (holding that the state free speech
guarantee does not require state action); New Jersey v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980)
(holding that private regulations of Princeton University could not violate the First Amend-
ment). See Julian N. Eule & Jonathan D. Varat, Transporting First Amendment Norms to the
Private Sector: With Every Wish There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1537 (1998), for a thor-
ough listing and discussion of the state cases and of the larger problems presented by
extending the First Amendment (or its State equivalent) to private property.
273. E.g., Lane, 457 P.2d at 564-65;JM.B. Realty Co., 650 A.2d at 771; Schmid, 423 A.2d at
628-30.
274. E.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (holding private shop-
ping center open to public speech under California Constitution); Schmid, 423 A.2d at 615
(involving the campus of Princeton University).
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any event, the constitutional theories are overbroad and, frankly,
unnecessary to achieve the more modest locational privileges for
the limited forms of public art with which we are concerned.Y
More to the point, we do not suggest abandoning an owner's pri-
vate property rights or dispensing with the law of trespass, but
instead limiting its remedies through a narrow and conditional
common law privilege for trespass by art that does no harm. Our
proposal, therefore, is that the common law of trespass, both civil
and criminal, be qualified, as with nuisance law, with a require-
ment of harm to the owner of the land: a harmless trespass by art,
in short, should not be actionable.
Having said this, however, there are a number of constitutional
considerations that bear on, and indeed compliment, our pro-
posal. We outline them below, beginning with the underlying issue
of whether a private trespass action qualifies as state action trigger-
ing First Amendment scrutiny, and proceeding to the question of
the forms of constitutionally required harm in the trespass action.
We then turn to the issues of government-compelled speech deriv-
ing from possible attribution of the art and its message to the
private owner, and then turn briefly to attribution in the setting of
government property. Our purpose is to show how the constitu-
tional right of free expression through art supports and clarifies
the rules of criminal and common law trespass that we propose for
art. In the process of making these points, however, we also fashion
the skeletal outlines of an argument that much of what we propose
may be constitutionally required.
A. State Action
For the Constitution to apply to restrictions on trespassory art,
there must be involvement of the government, or state action, in
the challenged process.276 The government, of course, has estab-
lished by law the very idea of private property and the rights of
ownership that attend it. The ownership of private property is ex-
plicitly acknowledged and protected against government takings in
the Constitution itself.2 7 7 The meaning of private property and the
rights of ownership and control by the property owner are the
275. See Eule & Varat, supra note 272.
276. The textual source of the state action requirement is the Fourteenth Amendment
and also, for our purposes, the First Amendment, whose prohibition applies to Congress,
and which was extended (incorporated) to action of the States by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. U.S. Const. amend. I, XIV.
277. U.S. Const. amend. V.
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creatures of the common law and legislation, largely at the state
level.7 The remedies for violation of the property owners' rights
are also creatures of the common law and of civil and criminal
statutes.279
We do not argue that property and its ownership, of itself, in-
volves state action. While property is the product of government,
its ownership is essentially a private right against others, whether
private individuals or organizations or government. In its well-
established meaning, state action is not implicated in these essen-
tially private rights, any more than owning a car constitutes state
action bringing the Constitution to bear on one's use of the car.
Like the law of libel that rests on one's "property-like" interest in
reputation among others, reputation and its enjoyment (or not) is
not governed by the Constitution. s°
Yet if a person's reputation is damaged by another and that per-
son seeks the assistance of government in vindicating her
reputation or being compensated for its loss, state action is quite
directly involved in the judicial process through which the cause of
action for libel is adjudicated by a court enforcing the law of repu-
tation.2 8 ' And at that point constitutional limitations, structured as
constitutional privileges under the First Amendment, fully apply.
In the setting of defamation actions, these constitutional privileges
take the form of elements that must be proved (like negligence,
malice, and the falsity of the challenged statement) ,22 burdens and
standards of proof,282 limitations on the type and degree of harm
284that can qualify for recovery, and limitations on the types of re-
medies that can be constitutionally granted (such as actual and not
presumed damages) .25
Like the tort of defamation for wrongful injury to reputation-
or its criminal defamation counterparts-trespass actions, civil and
278. KEETON ET AL., supra note 41, § 13; UGO MATTEI, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY
LAW: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC INTRODUCTION 1-13 (2000).
279. MATTEI, supra note 278.
280. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 265-68 (1964); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. d (1965);
KEETON ET AL., supra note 41, § 111; 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION
§§ 1.21-1.27 (2d ed. 2009).
281. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 265-68.
282. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346-47 (discussing negligence for private persons); Sullivan, 376
U.S. at 279-80 (discussing actual malice for public figures).
283. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775-76 (1986) (under Sulli-
van and Gertz the plaintiff bears the burden of proving falsity, as well as actual malice and
negligence, by clear and convincing evidence).
284. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50 (stating that actual damages must be proven and recovery
is limited to actual damage).
285. Id.
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criminal, invoke the power of government and its courts to
adjudicate the otherwise private property dispute and to impose
remedies with the force of law. And like defamation by speech,
which implicates protected speech, s6 trespass by art likewise
implicates protected expression when its enforcement and
vindication rest upon the active hand of government.
Application of the First Amendment to a trespass action based
on trespass by art, however, doesn't flow quite this simply from the
defamation cases, though the analogy is indeed a close one. The
Supreme Court's state action doctrine, as it is inaptly called, is
widely described as incoherent and riddled with anomalies. For
example, trespass on the premises of another for the purpose of
political protest or speech is generally not sufficient to invoke First
Amendment limitations when enforced through civil or criminal
actions, though there are exceptions.2 9 The reasons for this result
are varied. In some cases the First Amendment is simply judged to
be inapplicable because the trespass dispute is purely private, and
enforcing it through a court is not deemed sufficient to disturb the
enforcement of established law as between the private parties. 90 In
other cases the First Amendment is considered, but is determined
to have no effect because the harm from a trespass is the trespass
itself and the owner's interest in complete dominion satisfies any
constitutional requirement of a substantial and narrowly tailored
overriding interest.
2 91
Yet even in the speech setting, there are notable exceptions to
this rule. In Shelley v. Kraemer,9 2 the Supreme Court denied a prop-
erty owner's interest in dominion over land by negating a racially
restrictive covenant. And in the speech setting, the Court in
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware C0.29 3 reversed the convictions of par-
ticipants in an illegal (under state law) boycott against private
merchants. Finally, in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 94 the
Supreme Court denied recognition of a private restaurant's racially
286. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 265-68.
287. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 6.4 (2d
ed. 2002) (providing a comprehensive overview of the state action doctrine); Eule & Varat,
supra note 272; William P. Marshall, Diluting Constitutional Rights: Rethinking "Rethinking State
Action", 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 558 (1985).
288. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 287, § 6.4.4.2.
289. E.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
290. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (finding no dedication of private property
to public use entitling respondents to First Amendment protection); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,
407 U.S. 551, 570 (1972) (same); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 287, §§ 6.4.2-6.4.3.
291. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 330-32 (1964) (Black,J, dissenting).
292. 334 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1948).
293. 458 U.S. at911-12.
294. 365 U.S. 715, 725-26 (1961).
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restrictive policies, judging that the government's leasing of the
space to the private restaurant was sufficient to bring state action
into play. The ultimate effect, of course, was to deny the private
owner full dominion over his property.29 These cases, however, are
exceptions-and often analytically distinct exceptions-to the gen-
eral rule that ownership and dominion disputes will not trigger the
state action doctrine.
But notwithstanding this, the involvement of the state and the
satisfaction of any state action requirement should not present a
state action problem in an artistic trespass case, in which the First
Amendment claim challenges the constitutionality of the state law
of property and the forms of relief ordered by the state's courts.
This is especially true when the challenged actions are the reme-
dies formulated and enforced by the state. As the Supreme Court
put it in New York Times v. Sullivan:
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Ala-
bama courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners
claim to impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional
freedoms of speech and press. It matters not that that law has
been applied in a civil action and that it is common law only
.... The test [of state action] is not the form in which state
power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such
power has in fact been exercised.9"
B. Harms from Trespass
A second and critically important constitutional issue is the types
and gravity of harms that are caused by trespassory art. With the
types of art we have earlier described, the resulting harms are
greatly varied, both in type and duration.297 Parkour, for example,
may involve trespass on land and structures, but the trespass is
generally short lived and need not do physical damage to either
land or buildings. 29" The harm from graffiti and similar forms of
writing or painting may be aesthetic, may involve costs of removal,
and may threaten forced attribution of the art to the owner (a
295. See also Bell, 378 U.S. at 331 (Black,J, dissenting).
296. 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (citations omitted). The same rule of state action applies
to the privacy and other communicative torts. See infra notes 317-320 and accompanying
text.
297. See supra Part I.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 52-77.
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subject that we take up separately in the next Section) .
Shop-dropping, as with soup cans re-wrapped in artistic covering,
may cause financial harm to the merchant and confusion to the
customer.30 0 Theatre or performance art, such as the freezing in
place in Grand Central Station, may cause some congestion or con-
fusion, depending on the place and time of day, but is short
lived.3°'
Before we analyze specific types or degrees of harm, we must
address the more generally recognized harm to exclusive control
and dominion, especially regarding real property.30 2 Here, as
earlier, the defamation analogy is a useful, but by no means deter-
minative one. Like the interest in control and dominion
under trespass law, the interest in reputation under libel law was
broad and fixed and served as an adequate justification for recov-
ery in and of itself.3 3 That is, the common law libel tort protected a
person's reputation whether or not the reputation was true orjusti-
fied-whether or not, that is, the defamatory statement was true or
not.3 4 Truth was usually a defense for the defamer, but it was prac-
tically ineffective because truth is often impossible to prove, and
failure to succeed in proving it was further punished by treating
the failure as yet another defamation.3 0 5 The defamed person's
reputation was easy to prove and indeed was practically presumed,
as were, more importantly, damages. The law of defamation em-
ployed the remedial device of presumed damage from the
disparagement of reputation itself, and the jury was free to render
its own judgment, unencumbered by the need for any specific
proof of actual harm, on the question of the amount of damages to
be awarded.3 0 1 "How much would you demand if someone accused
you of infidelity?" was the way the plaintiff's lawyer would put the
damage question. And while other actual and economic forms of
damage were also recoverable, with but rare exceptions such forms
of damage need not be proven as a precondition to recovering
general damages.3°8 For all practical and legal purposes, therefore,
the interest in one's reputation served, for defamation,just like the
299. See supra text accompanying notes 43-46.
300. See supra text accompanying notes 29-42.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 47-51.
302. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. Rjv. 885,
970-74 (2000); supra text accompanying notes 317-320.
303. KEETON ET AL., supra note 41, §§ 111-13.
304. See id. § 116.
305. Id.
306. See id. § I16A, at 843.
307. Id.
308. Id.
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interest in dominion and control for the property owner suing for
trespass.
When the Supreme Court concluded that a libel action consti-
tuted state action and brought the Constitution to bear as a limit
on a plaintiffs recovery, a set of privileges required by the First
Amendment were imported into the libel tort. These include re-
quirements that reputation be proved,' that harm from the
reputational loss-not the reputational loss itself-be proved,1 °
and that the falsity of the challenged statement be proved by clear
and convincing evidence. 31 ' Thus actual proven damage became
the foundation of the tort. Presumed damages were declared viola-
tive of the First Amendment interest in robust and uninhibited
speech.1 Speech should not be inhibited by the prospect of liabil-
ity from intruding on another's reputation unless the libel is
proved by the plaintiff to be a knowing or reckless-or in private
libel cases negligent-false and damaging statement.
13
Importing the First Amendment into trespass actions in a similar
way would yield results broadly similar to those we propose. Not
only would the trespass have to be proved in its particulars by the
plaintiff, but the actual damage flowing from the trespass would
also have to be specified and proved by clear and convincing evi-
314dence. Presumed or general damages, now available in trespass
actions,1 would be unavailable because of their inhibiting effect on
artistic expression. And the owner would have to prove that the
artist-trespassers were aware that the property was private and that
others were not invited, that damage would result, and that they
intentionally or negligently trespassed nonetheless. 6 Trespass ac-
tions, in other words, would require the kinds of harms and proofs
that we propose in the form of a modest change in the common
law of trespass.
309. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270-84 (1964).
310. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 347-51 (1974); see Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283-84;
SMOLLA, supra note 280.
311. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342; Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283-84; see SMOLLA, supra note 280.
312. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50 ("It is necessary to restrict defamation plaintiffs who do
not prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth to compensation for actual
injury.").
313. Id. at 347-51; Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-84.
314. Cf Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-51; Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283-84.
315. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
316. This, at least, would seem to be the equivalent standard to the actual malice test in
the libel setting: knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-
80; see also St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1968) (finding that the failure to
investigate before publication is not actual malice unless the publisher harbored serious
doubts about the truth of the defamatory statement).
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A similar system of First Amendment privileges and proofs has
been imposed by the Supreme Court in another analogous setting:
the right to privacy that protects against public disclosures of
intimate personal facts.1 7 There newsworthiness stands as a consti-
tutional privilege against liability in a privacy action, the First
Amendment premise being that personally identifiable informa-
tion is part of our cultural vocabulary-part of the habits and
conventions of expression in our culture 31"-and that while every-
thing need not be made public, the price of easily obtained
damages for proven losses is the inhibition of valuable and non-
invasive expression for fear of liability.""
The privacy cases are relevant to our trespass analysis in two
ways. First, they rest on a judgment by the Supreme Court that
speech about the private affairs of others is valuable under the First
Amendment.320 Similarly, with respect to art whose trespassory na-
ture is inherent, the artistic expression itself is of undoubted value
and its inhibition by the tight constraints of property law would
discourage it. Second, and more importantly, an interest often ex-
pressed in justification of complete rights of dominion over
property is the right to privacy and repose. To the homeowner who
wishes to escape the noise and bustle of everyday life, this is surely
a substantial interest, but it may be much less so to the grocer or
the owner of Grand Central Station or the urban dweller. Our
point is not to judge those interests categorically, but rather to sug-
gest that, as with privacy, a closer and more specific examination of
the privacy-like interests of a property owner and the fact of their
actual harm is not too much to ask when artistic expression pro-
tected by the First Amendment is also at stake.
The types of provable and specific harms that would often flow
from artistic trespass, other than the undifferentiated loss of do-
minion, have been discussed earlier in connection with our
proposed modification of the common law of trespass by borrow-
ing, remedially, from the law of nuisance. They include loss of
market value of the property, physical damage to the property, dis-
placement of or interference with intended or actual productive
use, loss of peace and solitude, disruption, and threat to security.
Their existence and magnitude in any instance would depend on
317. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (broadcast of a 17-year-old rape
victim's name).
318. See id. at 489-96.
319. See id.
320. Id.; see also Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis's Privacy Ibrt, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291, 332-34 (1983) (discussing the value of gossip
in society and under the First Amendment).
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the duration and nature of the artistic use, the social value of that
use, and the use's proportionality and connection to the artistic
purposes being sought.
These kinds of factors operate much like the fair use defense
operates in copyright law where, like trespass, the "property" right
is fixed, and the justifications for intruding upon it take the form
of defenses, or privileges, going to liability and remedy only.32 1 In
copyright law, the use of another's copyrighted material is an in-
fringement, just as an artist's use of another's private property is a
trespass. 22 Indeed, many copyright decisions and much scholarly
commentary treat the copyright interest much like private prop-
erty-even real property.3 13 But as with our suggestion about a
nuisance-like harm requirement, the fair use defense (or privilege)
denies recovery for an infringement whose use of material is so-
cially useful, limited to its social purpose, and not substantially324
harmful. This, of course, is the essence of what we suggest be ac-
complished for real property through a common law privilege for
art that trespasses.
C. Attribution
1. Attribution to Private Property Owners
There is one harm that warrants special attention, however, for it
is of constitutional importance to the property owner. This is the
harm of attribution, or, more specifically, of wrongful association of
the property owner with the message or taste or style of the alleg-
edly offending art. A politically controversial work of graffiti art on
the side of a building may lead a viewer to believe that it meets with
the owner's or occupier's approval, and thus to attribute the senti-
ment to the owner or occupier. Were the owner's objections not
considered when judging constitutional privilege for the art, the
owner would effectively be forced by the state to express a view
321. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976); see Pierre Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L.
Rev. 1105 (1990).
322. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-04 (2006)
323. E.g., NEIL W. NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX (2008); Epstein, supra note 147;
Epstein, supra note 230; Epstein, supra note 233; EPSTEIN, supra note 234; Epstein, supra
note 236; Leval, supra note 321; Neil W. Netanel, Locating Copyright Within theFirst Amendment
Skein, 54 STAN. L. REv. 1 (2001); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doc-
trine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137 (1990).
324. For an interesting and broad-based article, see Anne Barron, Copyright Law and the
Claims ofArt, 4 INTELL. PROP. Q. 368 (2002).
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with which she disagrees. Such a result would violate the owner's
First Amendment right of free speech. 5
The Supreme Court's forced speech jurisprudence began with
the case of Wooley v. Maynard,32 6 in which a New Hampshire couple
objected to the State's motto, "Live Free or Die," on their license
plate and accordingly covered it over. The Supreme Court held
that the act of covering the motto was protected by the First
Amendment because requiring its display would force the May-
nards to express a government message with which they
disagreed-a message, the Court implied, that would be attributed
to the Maynards, who disagreed with it.
32 7
Since Maynard, compelled speech cases have arisen in a wide va-
riety of settings. For our purposes, the relevant cases involve, at
their core, the question of attribution: what or whom does the au-
dience or onlooker consider the source of the speech to be? With
trespassory art, the question is whether the observer or hearer con-
cludes that the artistic expression is endorsed by the property
owner. On this question the Maynard case is rather extreme, as it is
intuitively doubtful that another driver seeing the license plate and
State motto would conclude that the Maynards, personally, en-
3281dorsed the message.
In the context of attribution to a private speaker, the Court has
adopted a less extreme but nevertheless generous attribution rule
to the organizers of a parade to whom an endorsement of homo-
sexuality would be attributed by the parade audience by virtue of
the inclusion of a gay rights group in the parade.329And in the arts
setting, private artists supported by National Endowment for the
Arts grants were unsuccessful in claiming that their artistic expres-
sion was solely their own; it was, the Court said, instead shaped by
the programmatic patronage of the government.3 " In other cases,
however, attribution has not been found. The views expressed by a
religious student newspaper subsidized by the University of Vir-
ginia were attributed to the student organization publishing the
paper, and not the University, on the ground, apparently, that the
student activity system was an open forum and that reasonable ob-
325. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-17 (1977). See generally Bezanson, supra note
232, at 985-88.
326. 430 U.S. at 714-17.
327. Id. at 714-16.
328. Equally extreme is Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753
(1995), which involved an unaccompanied Latin cross standing near the steps of the Ohio
State Capitol. A divided Court presumed attribution of the message to the government, at
least in the absence of a clear disclaimer.
329. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
330. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587-88 (1998).
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servers would not conclude that the University endorsed the
speech s.3  Similarly, in another case, private beef producers who
were required to fund government-sponsored pro-beef advertise-
ments were unsuccessful in claiming that the advertisement
messages would be attributed to them."'
The attribution cases are complex and far from coherent, 333 but
we need not plumb them in great depth here. The fairly straight-
forward question of whether art placed on private property-or on
government property, discussed later-would be understood to
have the endorsement of the property owner is a fairly straightfor-
ward one. And it is, for private property, a dominantly
circumstantial one, dependent on the observer's ordinary percep-
tions3 4 Many such cases can be resolved by common sense and
intuition; others may require specific testimony or other forms of
evidence. In the former category would be many forms of graffiti,
parkour, and the silent, frozen performance in Grand Central
Station, where cultural conventions lead to general perceptions
about authorship, or, with Grand Central, where the dissonance
between the traffic function of the place and bodies frozen amidst
the flow of people strongly suggest that the owners would not
sponsor or endorse the performance art. On the other hand, graf-
335fiti in the form of a painted mural on a train car, or a mural on
the side of a building, or shopdropped artistic soup cans on the
shelf, may involve more complex perceptual questions.36
Yet the ultimate question, as a matter of constitutional law, is
whether the State, by enforcing a trespass regime that permits tres-
passory art, can be held legally accountable for the attribution of
art to the owner and the resulting compelled speech. The constitu-
tional question has only infrequently arisen in the context of such
a largely private dispute, but the instances in which it has arisen
suggest that the Constitution would limit the State's action, even
though it is indirect. In the Hurley case, involving a private parade
331. Rosenburgerv. Rectors of Univ. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
332. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
333. For a comprehensive review of the full range of cases and their theoretical and
practical underpinnings, see Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Gov-
ernment Speech, 86 IowA L. REv. 1377 (2001); Carolina M. Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is
Both Private and Governmenta4 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 605 (2008).
334. The question is more complex with government property, where questions of pub-
lic forum arise, both as a matter of first amendment law and of reasonableness of audience
understanding, and where the Court has suggested that the standard is one of a reasonable
observer who is cognizant of the history and background of the speech and the government
policy governing the place. E.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000);
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 819; Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
335. See supra text accompanying notes 43-46.
336. See supra text accompanying notes 29-46; Bezanson, supra note 232.
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and a dispute about whether the parade organizer or the parade
participant was the true speaker for purposes of the First Amend-
ment, the government's role in enacting a law prohibiting
discrimination based on sexual orientation was sufficient to bring
the attribution question to bear on the State's enforcement
power. Likewise, in the Dale case, the Court's conclusion that the
expressive significance of a gay scoutmaster would be seen as a
message of endorsement by the Boy Scouts organization led to the
conclusion that enforcement of the applicable anti-discrimination
law would deny the Boy Scouts of their freedom not to be com-
pelled to speak by the government:
In light of these cases, it seems clear that the government's role
as lawmaker is sufficient to trigger First Amendment scrutiny in a
private dispute, even where the government's role is indirect. In-
deed, in the trespass setting, the government's role in creating the
law of trespass and property, coupled with the government's direct
involvement in adjudicating the private dispute between artist-
trespasser and property owner, is even more obvious than in the
Hurley and Dale cases. This, of course, is the same conclusion
reached earlier under the explicit heading of state action.
Attribution, therefore, is an inescapable issue in the artistic tres-
pass setting if the relevant common law or constitutional rule is
that recovery by the property owner is limited by proof of actual
damage rather than simply trespass on the owner's absolute right
of dominion. And if such a rule of actual damage is, as discussed
earlier, constitutionally required, the question of attribution is in-
herent in any trespassory art case, 339 whatever the underlying state
law of trespass is. Therefore, unwanted attribution of trespassory
art to the property owner should, and indeed must, qualify as harm
for purposes of our proposal.
2. Government as Property Owner and Attribution
Our attention so far has been largely limited to trespassory art
on privately owned property. Government, too, owns property and
337. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557
(1995); see BEZANSON, supra note 61; Randall P. Bezanson & Michele Choe, Speaking Out of
Thin Air: A Comment on Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston,
25 HASTINGS COMM. ENT. L.J. 149 (2002).
338. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); see Randall P. Bezanson, Artifactual
Speech, 3 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 819 (2001).
339. And, indeed, attribution and first amendment rules would apply in any expressive
trespass setting. It is not our intention, however, to address the larger free speech implica-
tions of our analysis here.
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possesses the attributes of ownership that private parties possess.
But government is also directly limited in its property claims by the
First Amendment. The relevant rules of limitation are found in the
public forum doctrines and the accompanying standards of scru-
tiny that apply to the government's actions as a property owner.340
For government property that is classified as a public forum or a
limited public forum, the rules are well established and directly
limit the government's restrictions of expression, whether trespas-
sory or not.3 4 1 These rules directly apply to artistic expression and
yield much more protective results than our suggested modifica-
tion of common law remedies in the trespass setting because of the
background presumption of access to public property for purposes
of expression. 42
But for government property that is neither a public forum nor
a limited forum for expression, the government has a relatively
free hand to manage and control access to and activities on its
property. The main exception is that the government cannot pro-
hibit expression simply because of its message or content, though
343it may limit all expression or even all expression of general types.
Our proposal, therefore, would have potentially meaningful appli-
cation to this form of government property, as it would limit the
government's ability to prohibit all art.
As a general matter, the common law and constitutional analysis
outlined in the previous pages would apply equally to government
as property owner and to private property owners. 4" The nature of
claimed harms, and the relevant circumstances in which trespass
occurred, would be different, but they would be evaluated within
the same analytical framework applied to private property. The
government should be barred, for example, from resting its au-
thority on a universal right of dominion and control, without
more. The attribution question, however, may be a bit more com-
plicated. It will involve, first, the question of the observers'
awareness that the property is the government's, and the effect that
340. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 287, § 11.4, for a masterful, clearer and succinct
overview of the public forum concept, the types of forums, and the types of scrutiny applied
in each.
341. Id. § 11.4.2.2 (discussing public forums and strict scrutiny), § 11.4.2.3 (discussing
limited public forums, content neutrality and reasonableness), § 11.4.2.4 (discussing non-
public forums and reasonableness in relation to function of property).
342. E.g, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); Southeastern Promotions,
Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
343. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 287, §§ 11.4.2.4-11.4.2.5.
344. For our purposes this is a conceptually useful way to look at the government as
non-forum property owner, but of course the government possesses many specific powers as
owner that are provided in at the Constitutional or statutory level and have nothing to do
with free speech. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; art. IV, § 3.
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such knowledge would have on reasonable judgments about au-
thorship and endorsement. And it will likely involve, as the
Supreme Court's opinions suggest, the related assumption that the
observers' judgment should assume an awareness of the ownership,
perhaps, and of the laws, policies, and uses that underlie the gov-
ernment's claimed right of control over access. 45A nuclear test site,
or a secret government facility, for example, might justify a flat
prohibition on access even in the face of ignorance by the artistic
trespasser. These are not insurmountable obstacles or problems, in
our judgment, but they require some differences in the form or
elements of First Amendment analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
It is not our view that the Constitution requires that trespass
remedies be limited when the trespass takes the form of art. But we
do think that the impact of blunt-edged property justifications and
remedies untied to real harm do present constitutional issues when
applied to art, and that a common law reform of remedies limited
to proven harm and privileges that recognize the value of art and
artistic expression even against private property would be fully con-
sistent with the constitutional rules applied in other property-type
settings.
A. A New Rule of Trespass that Accommodates Trespassory Art
We propose that state courts recognize a common law privilege
for locationally appropriate art that trespasses on the property of
another. The privilege draws on the remedial law of nuisance. It
would attach in a civil trespass action346 in which damages are
sought. The privilege would be invoked by the defendant-
trespasser upon a showing that the trespass was locationally justi-
fied for artistic purposes. The effect of the privilege would be to
require the plaintiff-property owner 347 to prove that the trespass
caused actual damage to the property owner in the form of eco-
nomic harm or reputational harm, which we call attribution harm,
345. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
346. The privilege could easily and naturally be applied to other forms of action
grounded in a trespass or property invasion by art, including personal property and intellec-
tual property invasions, and also to a criminal trespass action, given the constitutional
grounds upon which it can be justified. But we restrict our focus here to the classic trespass
on real property.
347. Owner would include, for instance, a lessee or assignee.
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that is not justified by the nature and value of the intruding art. In
the absence of proof of actual damage, the trespass would be privi-
leged and the damage action dismissed.
We do not, however, propose that the privilege extinguish the
trespass. Thus, a property owner would still be entitled to insist on
the removal of the trespassing art and enforce that right legally
through equitable means, such as injunction. But in an action to
force the art's removal, the defendant-artist would be afforded a
limited privilege to continue the trespass if, as in nuisance law, the
clear social benefit of the artistic trespass outweighs the owner's
private interests and thus prevents, delays, or alters the owner's en-
forcement of the trespass claim. Whether, for how long, and under
what conditions the trespass is allowed to continue in such a case is
to be determined by a court in the exercise of its equitable discre-
tion.
Art is a form of expression protected by the First Amendment,
and it can therefore be argued that the privilege we propose is re-
quired in some form by the Constitution, and indeed it can be
argued that such a privilege should also be recognized for certain
types of trespassory, non-artistic speech. We believe, however, that
artistic expression, while protected, is in many ways distinct from
purely cognitive speech, and thus that its protection may take dif-
ferent forms and face different limits. For example, artistic
expression is highly sensual and evokes idiosyncratic meaning in
the minds of the individual viewer or listener. Trespassory art uses
property as an element of the process of sensual re-representation,
or the creation of new meaning. Strictly cognitive speech does not.
Art therefore has a different claim to use of space or place, and
arguably a more forceful claim than that of a speaker seeking an
audience for a message. Attribution and reputational harm will
often look very different with art than with speech, where a single
cognitive message to an audience is intended and reasonably ex-
pected. Indeed, the same difficulty may exist with financial harm-
for example, harm to business-for the audience may find the
trespassing art enjoyable and merely incidental and therefore not
make shopping or other decisions based on its presence.
For these and other related reasons, we conclude that a com-
mon law privilege coupled with equitable discretion in a court
responds to the characteristics of artistic expression with flexibility
and attention to the circumstances in which the art appears,
whether it consist of freezing in place in Grand Central Station or
Best Buy, parkour in an urban or rural setting, or the more perma-
nent form of artistic graffiti. The known fact of First Amendment
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concerns should inform a common law court's treatment of a case,
but those concerns need not yield an inflexible set of constitu-
tional rules that might (as with the libel tort) convert a flexible and
equitable judgment into a technically complex and rigid constitu-
tional and legal framework.
B. The Value of Trespassory Art
Art "evoke [s] imaginary worlds, and not representation in the
strict and narrow sense., 348 Its value, in other words, lies not so
much in the creativity of the artist, but in the creativity of the
audience-the viewer, listener, reader, or participant. This is
especially so with public art, which inserts into the empirical reality
of daily life an instance of sensual reflection, of imagination, of
disrupted cognition, of serious aesthetic contemplation. As Dewey
put it, "[t] he product of art-temple, painting, statue, poem, is not
the work of art. The work takes place when a human being
cooperates with the product so that the outcome is an experience
that is enjoyed because of its liberating and ordered properties."349
Dewey called the "idea of art as a conscious idea-the greatest
intellectual achievement in the history of humanity.'5
0
In a society as devoted to private property as ours is, where pub-
lic property is even viewed as the equivalent of private property in
the hands of government, it is difficult for public art truly to flour-
ish. And the limitations we place on the experience and role of art
in our lives affect the culture in which we live and the opportuni-
ties for creative expression and creative comprehension in the
public mind. Art in America is largely confined to public and pri-
vate museums, galleries, performance halls, and buildings, where it
is usually placed in service of the function of the space or the tastes
of the patrons. Music may be the exception to this rule, as noise is
largely unregulated in our culture and laws. Music is nuisance, not
trespass, in American law. Visual art may appear in the public
spaces of a building, but not on railroad cars, a decidedly func-
tional venue. Art may appear on a building at the behest of the
owner, but a laser image cast on the building at night is a trespass
even if the building is not in use. A grocery store shelf is a deter-
minedly functional space; replacing labels with art is disruptive of
the commercial function. Theatre is allowed ... well, in a theatre,
348. KAROL BERGER, A THEORY OF ART 62 (2000).
349. JOHN DEWEY, ART As EXPERIENCE 222 (Penguin Group 2005) (1934).
350. Id. at 26.
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or in another dedicated space, not in Grand Central Station or
Best Buy or on thoroughfares or sidewalks. Billboards assault our
consciousness on streets and highways, but not art. Are we afraid of
art when it does not harm because it looses feeling and
emotion and idiosyncratic meaning? Or are we afraid of speech-
messages about politics or smut or hate-and of our inability to
distinguish speech from art? Art may well have been the first form
of communication, preceding language, drawn on the walls of
caves and enjoyed by dance and ritual 35 Art speaks, but it does so
by evoking imagination and memory and failure and greatness. We
might call it full-bodied expression. Even more than speech, it is
universal.
For the individual who experiences it, art fosters creativity and
individuality. It is, like the allied practice of religion, self-defining
in its effect and socially constructive in its application. It spurs
critical reflection and thought, and is thus deeply cognitive as well
as sensual and aesthetic. It requires acts of imagination, of relation-
ship between events and places and people and things, and
ultimately of contemplation of the cognitively unknowable.
Much art is also locationally dependent. That is, its sensual and
creative force relies on place and time and manner. Photographing
large numbers of nude bodies is, for Tunick, a means of re-
representation-of a bridge in Australia, a vast public space in
Rome, a thoroughfare like Fifth Avenue in New York, a glacier in
the North. What are the meanings of these photographic perform-
ances? What is being said, and why? Can it be said in a property-law
domesticated venue? Will it be truly public there? Will freezing in
place have the same aesthetic and sensory affect in a gymnasium
rather than in Grand Central Station? Can it produce the same
kinds of acts of public imagination? We think not. And we think
our culture and our lives would be enriched by truly public art.
There is, of course, a major problem. How do we know whether
something claimed as art will produce the advantages that we have
outlined? Must we know what art is? In whose hands should we
place the authority to decide? These are difficult problems, but
perhaps not entirely insurmountable ones. We propose opening a
space for art when it produces no actual harm-a place where un-
intended harm is compensated if it actually occurs. A place where
artistic value to the public can be shown, and where justification
for the trespass must be tied to the nature of the art. A place where
351. For a discussion of the research that exists on this question, see JEAN AITCHISON,
THE SEEDS OF SPEECH: LANGUAGE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION (1996); Thomas Wyn, Did Homo
Erectus Speak., 8 CAMBRIDGE ARCRAEOLOGICALJ. 78 (1998).
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what is done is clearly an act of art and cannot be confused with
the ideas or tastes of the owner of the property, whether a private
owner or government. A place where judgments are made in the
realm of the specific by the common law and the public jury.
Our proposal, then, is a modest one of limited range. It is not a
broad constitutional rule. Even so, the results may at times be
messy and controversial, but with limited damages based in nui-
sance law the costs may be well outweighed even by the public
controversy and discussion sparked by the claim of art and loca-
tion. If art opens minds and experiences and imagination to new
ways of understanding and seeing and critical thinking, the price
will be well worth paying.
